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Abstract:  
This project investigates the newly proposed EU Energy Union from a Normative 
Institutionalist approach, evaluating how the adoption of normative commitments by 
the Member States could under the fulfillment of certain conditions reduce the 
interdependence between the EU and Russia. The project evaluates the applicability 
of Normative Institutionalism in a policy field, which has always been dominated by 
national decision-making and thereby usually subject to realistic and 
Intergovernmentalist approaches. Through a critical examination of 4 selected key 
areas of the Energy Union and a theoretical discussion, we conclude that Normative 
Institutionalism does indeed present a valid approach to assess the unique potential 
that exists in the Energy Union proposal. Furthermore we present an argument that the 
Energy Union can drastically change the EU-Russia relations if the assumptions of 
normative and policy commitments withstand the future policy negotiations. 
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1. Problem Formulation: Could the EU Energy Union provide the necessary 
conditions needed to lessen Russian energy dependence through normative 
commitments by the Member States – and to what extent are such commitments under 
progress? 
 
2. Working questions: 
 
1) What has historically constituted the Energy relationship between Russia and 
the EU? 
2) What conditions makes the proposal of an Energy Union significantly 
different from previous attempts at establishing a common foreign energy 
policy? 
3) How could the theory of Normative Institutionalism provide the necessary 
framework to explain if the Energy Union fulfills the necessary conditions 
needed to create a common foreign policy? 
4) Could any alternative theory equally provide an adequate understanding of 
such a process? 
 
3. Problem field: 
 
The European Union has recently proposed a new common energy policy in the form 
of an Energy Union. The Energy Union consists of 5 closely related and mutually 
reinforcing dimensions: Secure Supplies, Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, 
Emissions Reduction, and Research and Innovation in Energy. These are areas in 
which collective action has historically been hindered greatly by individual action (D. 
Keating, 2015). The proposal comes in a time where the 2014 Crimean crisis has 
raised new doubts about the functionality of EU’s energy policies and foreign policy. 
The Energy Union is a very ambitious project, which requires solid cooperation and 
solidarity in order to succeed (Commission, 2015). Our focus is on the norms of the 
EU and the normative commitments provided by Member States in order to 
investigate if the Energy Union possesses the sufficient conditions in order for EU to 
collectively diminish dependency on the energy import from Russia. In order to 
address this problem we will primarily be working with the dimensions of secure 
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supplies and the internal energy market. These two dimensions concerns the 
diversification of energy imports, and a free internal energy market.  
 
An important part of the Energy Union thus revolves around reducing dependence of 
energy imports from major suppliers through diversifying imports and establishing 
alternative transit routes. Russia currently exports 65% of its gas to Europe, while the 
EU import 53% of its consumed energy from Russia, and several EU Member States 
are fully dependent on the Russian gas exports (Gazprom & BP Statistical Review 
2013, p. 2). The Crimean crisis has indeed underlined the imminent need for the EU 
to establish a common foreign energy policy. The Post-Crimean political landscape 
has put diversification of transit routes for various forms of energy very high on the 
political Agenda. Implicitly the goal of less Russian energy dependency is very clear 
throughout all publications on the Energy Union (Directorate-General for External 
Policies, 2014, p. 1-5; Commission, 2014, p. 1-6).  
 
Aside from an ambition of becoming less dependent on energy from outside the EU it 
does also include an impetus of becoming more efficient with the use of domestic 
energy sources, and diversifying to other sources and suppliers while reaching its 
declared climate goals of 2030 (Commission, 2015). The policy proposal of the 
Energy Union is in this sense collaboration of various policy areas. The Energy 
Union’s interconnectivity and interrelatedness between the various policy areas as a 
measure to collectively meet the very different policy preferences in the EU has 
received positive feedback from the Member States. All 28 Member States has agreed 
on the idea of the Energy Union. What remains to be decided and what will be center 
for debate is however what should constitute the policy (D. Keating, 2015, p. 1; 
Commission, 2015) 
 
What is central in these policy areas is a historical tendency for the Member States to 
be reluctant to give up sovereignty, and legislative competences as the legal 
framework concerning energy, leaves it very much to the Member States to nationally 
coordinate their own energy strategy. Correspondingly the theoretical approach to 
energy policy formation has relied heavily on the usage of Realist and 
Intergovernmentalist institutional theories. The consensus to engage in the creation of 
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the Energy Union though calls for a re-evaluation of an appropriate theory to account 
for why states would engage cooperatively and furthermore what we can expect of the 
Energy Union and its foreign policy effect.  
 
We thereby wish to investigate a causality where the Member State’s adoption of EU 
norms in terms of energy policy is the independent variable, and the decrease of 
Russian energy-dependency is the dependent variable. We will approach the raised 
problem through the theory of Normative Institutionalism, and examine its 
applicability to the problem. We will then critically evaluate the prospect of this 
newly proposed Energy Union arriving in a time where the conditions could seem 
drastically different from previously and thus encourage alternative approaches to 
policy negotiations. 
 
 
4. Concepts and usage 
 
This chapter will explain the main concepts used in the project. This concerns the 
concepts of norms, preferences, commitments, competences, appropriateness and 
divergence, which are concepts that are necessary to understand in order to grasp the 
content of this project. 
 
Norms 
Shared values and principles, achieved through procedural practice, which overtime 
become norms in international relations. There are several norms within the European 
Union, where we in this study wish to investigate the set of norms concerning energy 
policy and interdependency with Russia. 
 
Preferences 
A set of assumptions of how a Member State would be expected to act often based on 
the practice of norms. A preference is the choice of policy outcome, which a given 
state wishes to achieve and continue through cooperation. Preferences are not static 
and can be center to change over time as a countries goals and objectives changes. 
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Commitment 
The willingness to act, in order to change or withhold a given standard. In this study 
the commitment is concerning the degree of commitment showed by the Member 
States on the case of decrease, increase or preserve status quo of any given policy. 
 
Competences 
The principle of competences explains that the EU shall act within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in specific areas.  
There are two main types of competences; exclusive competences and shared 
competences, both of these competences are outlined in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. Exclusive competences allow the EU to act unitarily on 
certain areas outlined in Article 3 in TFEU (TFEU, 2012). Whereas the shared 
competences are areas where the EU shares the competences with the Member States, 
as explained in Article 4 in TFEU (TFEU, 2012). 
 
Appropriateness 
To what degree a specific act conforms with already existing norms. In this case this 
refers to what extent a possible act will correspond to the already existing norms 
within the European Union. 
 
Divergence 
Refers to the act of deviating from a given EU policy commitment. It can also relate 
to Member States who stand out relative to the other member states. 
 
5. Theory: 
 
5.1. Choice of Theory: 
 
In order for us to explain how a collective normative commitment envisioned in the 
Energy Union could potentially change the EU-Russia relations, we decided to 
incorporate a theory that theoretically would support the realization of such a policy. 
We do however acknowledge the idealistic nature of this theory and the limitations 
associated with it. Furthermore we are well aware that other theoretical approaches in 
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the field express very different assumptions and expectations. We will therefore 
engage in a brief introduction to, and outline some of the major opposing theories in 
the section below. 
 
A prominent theoretical approach used to assess EU agreement on common foreign 
policies is Intergovernmentalism. It was first presented by Stanley Hoffman as a 
theory of European integration that relies on realist ideas about the function of nation-
states and their government’s roles in international relations (Bache, George, 2011, p. 
12). Basically the theory rests on two fundamental principles of politics. First of, that 
states are the primary actors and secondly that the EU as an international institution 
can be studied by treating states as the critical actors in a context of anarchy.  
In relation to assessing Member State preferences in specific instances e.g. our case of 
intra-EU negotiations concerning the field of energy, Intergovernmentalism proposes 
that states achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining 
rather than through a centralized authority enforcing political commitments and 
directions. From this point of view the EU should be seen as an international forum 
for policy coordination more than anything else (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 480). This 
stands in contrast to the more influential and normative role the EU institutions has in 
Normative Institutionalism (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009) 
It is herein implicitly acknowledged that contemporary, institutions like the EU 
consists of Member States who possesses pre-eminent decision-making power and 
political legitimacy.  Furthermore the theory argues that Member States are rational, 
and agreements to cooperate or establish international institutions are merely a 
collective outcome of interdependent strategic rational state choices and 
intergovernmental negotiations (A. Wiener & T. Diez, 2009, p. 68). This notion will 
be implemented as an analytical tool, contesting our choice of theory when analyzing 
Member State preferences and intra-EU negotiations concerning energy dependence 
on Russia. The dimension of secure supplies embedded in the Energy Union can thus 
from an Intergovernmentalist stand be problematic, due to the divergent Member 
State preferences regarding supply and demand of energy from Russia (Gazprom & 
BP Statistical Review 2013, p. 2).  
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Intergovernmentalists argue, that decisions to cooperate internationally can be 
explained in a three-stage framework. Analytically that means to analyze a process in 
which states first define preferences, then bargain to substantive agreements, and 
finally create or adjust institutions to secure outcomes in cases of uncertainty. Each 
stage is separate and each stage is explained by a separate theory (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 
482).  
The theory presents different ways in which this process evolves. Usually a liberal 
theory of national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international 
negotiations, and a functional theory of institutional choice are adopted to complete 
an Intergovernmentalist approach. These explanations put forward concrete 
propositions, derived from theory, to be evaluated against Normative Institutionalism 
(A. Wiener & T. Diez, 2009, 69).  
 
The basic argument of the above is that EU integration can best be understood as a 
series of rational choices made by national leaders, influenced by domestic constraints 
and possibilities stemming from economic interests of powerful domestic forces, 
relative power of other states in relation to asymmetrical interdependence, and finally 
the role of institution’s task of strengthening the credibility of interstate commitments 
(Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18).        
 
While Normative Institutionalist theory might argue that the character of intra-EU 
negotiations and the resulting policy is determined by entrapment and cooperative 
approaches to pre-existing EU norms, Intergovernmentalism would argue the opposite 
e.g. that policies are shaped by Member States ability to use its veto option effectively 
and according to domestic interests (D.C Thomas, 2009, p. 349).   
 
5.2. Normative Institutionalism: 
 
To shed light on our problem we have chosen the theory of Normative 
Institutionalism. As our problem field revolves closely around policy negotiations and 
outcomes, we find D.C. Thomas’s description of Normative Institutionalist theory of 
intra- EU negotiations on foreign policy very appropriate as it encapsulates exactly 
our focus areas. We will utilize his theory as presented in his 2009 paper “Explaining 
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the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative Institutionalism and alternative 
approaches”. Apart from our main paper from D. C. Thomas on Normative 
Institutionalism we also utilize a later paper written in collaboration with F. 
Schimmelfennig reconsidering the theory in a more critical perspective 
Normative Institutionalism emphasizes the effect of pre-existing EU norms and 
commitments on foreign policy negotiations among Member States in the EU. It 
furthermore reinstates that the EU’s substantive and procedural norms significantly 
shape the behavior of its Member States (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 343). There is thus 
recognition of normative influences on Member States both through EU supranational 
behavior and through the states own behavior. Normative Institutionalism combines 
these acknowledgments to define the relationship between Member State behavior 
and EU policy creation. It proposes that EU decision-making on any given issue is 
created by normative and policy-commitments historically made by Member States in 
the course of creating EU’s external relationships. Alongside its overall claim that 
states are generally committed to ensuring the Union’s political viability it does 
however also acknowledge that the degree of normative and policy commitment vary 
from Member State to Member State, caused by the individual norms and preferences. 
These are however subject to change over time (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 343). If the 
theory of Normative Institutionalism is viable, these norms and policy commitments 
should have a significant effect on how Member States negotiate divergences in their 
policy preferences and on the type of policies they adopt at the EU level. From 
Normative Institutionalism it is expected that Member State’s will over time adopt 
and pursue the same normative commitments as the EU Institutions (D. C. Thomas, 
2009, p. 343).  
This leads to the assumption that the common value of solidarity and the normative 
policy commitments undertaken by the Member States will increase the chances of a 
collective agreement on any given policy area. Identification with European values 
and the following goals is in this manner transforming the process by which member 
states cooperatively bargain on foreign policy (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 344).  
Any expectations derived from the theory of Normative Institutionalism are deeply 
rooted in expectations that have over time been reinforced by procedural norms, 
which encourage policy-makers to seek consensus and avoid veto threats. These 
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procedural norms, shaped by institutional practice, have thus been embedded in the 
practice of Member State policy negotiations. This is what is termed the “consensus 
norm/consultation reflex”. What can be derived from this practice is an expectation 
that divergent Member States, who might otherwise work against a proposed policy, 
will through the consensus norm/consultation reflex engage in cooperative bargaining 
and reach a mutual compromise policy which aligns with the normative practice of 
the EU institutions (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 348). In short - states with norms and 
policies deviating from EU’s commitment can be expected to cooperate because they 
expect the social rewards or the physical rewards from cooperation to exceed the costs 
of compromise. It is this norm of cooperative bargaining, which in the end ensures 
that the Member States will adopt the normative behavior of the EU (D.C. Thomas, 
2009, p. 345). In a historical perspective the ability of norms and formal rules of 
institutions to progressively and gradually shape the actions of those acting within 
them, the logic of appropriateness means that actions are "matched to situations by 
means of rules organized into identities." Thus according to Normative 
Institutionalism, much of the behavior of institutional actors is based on an enactment 
by the Member States of the rules derived from institutional practice that generally 
govern “behavior for that actor in that particular situation” (J G. March, 1994, p. 50). 
It is finally again important to stress the theory’s, as well as our own, perspective in 
the analysis of EU actorness on member state-level, but with great attention to how 
norms and preferences on the EU-level is transferred to the member states through 
negotiation.  
 
Foreign policy is in Normative Institutionalism defined as “the set of policies adopted 
by the Union’s Member States to address issues and manage relationships beyond 
their collective external border” (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 340). These includes both 
policy areas in which the EU has exclusive competencies, but most importantly for 
this project also the policy areas where the EU and the Member States has shared 
competencies as is the case with Energy and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (TFEU, 2012, art. 4). This is an important aspect of the theory and our usage of 
it as policy outcomes from the Energy Union will be directed from a supranational 
authority but will be the product of member state negotiations vis-á-vis EU 
institutions.  
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Normative Institutionalism has thus been specifically chosen as we will argue that this 
theory creates the necessary understandings of Member State adoption of EU norms 
needed in order to understand if the Energy Union provide the necessary conditions 
for alignment of norms and commitments to be the crucial factor in the EU-Russia 
energy relations. The theory does as before mentioned explain how the normative EU 
policy commitments undertaken by the Member States will increase the chances of a 
collective agreement, and thereby success, of any given policy area. With these 
expectations in mind it provides foundation for us to investigate the conditions for 
Member States in the Energy Union to act according to Normative Institutionalism. 
The expectations presented in the theory and the conditions under which the 
expectations are most likely to occur are presented through two hypotheses. The 
specifics of these and the way we will use them in analysis will be explained in the 
methods section.  
5.3. Appropriateness of Normative Institutionalism to our problem field: 
 
It should at this point be outlined why we believe exactly Normative Institutionalism 
provides the most suitable expectations and analytical angle to analyze how the 
Energy Union could be groundbreaking in its attempt to act collectively on energy 
security. We will first and foremost provide and analysis of how but also discuss if the 
Energy Union may or may not have the potential needed to foster and ensure 
cooperation towards a common goal. Central to our choice is at least two very central 
parameters, which has contributed strongly to our choice of theory, which are EU 
rhetoric and current circumstances of international energy politics. These will be even 
further put into analytical context in the analysis section. 
 
Concerning rhetoric we will argue that as Normative Institutionalism as a given 
expects joint action as an “intrinsic value” among the Member States, including 
support for the functionality and credibility of the EU as a global actor, it is similarly 
reasonable to expect that rhetoric in this line of reasoning will be welcomed in a 
policy proposal (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 344). The enactment of existing normative 
policy commitments from the EU is very visible in the rhetoric surrounding the 
Energy Union. In the Commissions Energy Union Strategy it is outlined that the 
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ability for EU to be able to speak with one voice and execute great solidarity among 
the Member States is among the most important criteria for the project to succeed 
(Commission, COM:2015:80, p. 3). The Commission outlines in the Energy Union 
Factsheet that “uncoordinated national policies and the absence of a common stance 
vis-à-vis non-EU countries” is currently impeding process and the Energy Union has 
the ability to turn this tendency around (Commission, MEMO/15/4485). In the same 
line of argument it can be stated that energy security is built from within. It starts with 
having a common vision, objectives, and speaking with a united voice. It is thus 
crucial for the Energy Union’s rhetoric to enhance and catalyze these elements. (A. 
Hedberg, 2015, p. 2). Collective action from the Member States and a much higher 
degree of normative commitments is thus not only encouraged but also proposed as 
vital for the Energy Union to succeed in its goals.  
 
The Energy Union is far-reaching and overlaps on a number of policy areas. Our 
analytical vanishing point is EU-Russia energy dependency, and so the areas of 
“secure supplies” and the “internal energy market” falls naturally as correlative with 
EU’s energy relations to Russia. Concerning secure supplies the Commission states 
that Member States should be assured that in situations where supply is short or in 
worst-case disrupted they could rely on joint approaches and support from the 
community. In the strategy it is also highlighted that the “spirit of solidarity” in 
energy matters is explicitly mentioned in the Treaty and is at the heart of the Energy 
Union (Commission, COM:2015:80, p. 4). Concerning the “internal energy market” 
the Commission states that “Member States must coordinate and cooperate with their 
neighbors when developing their energy policies […] Given its particular 
vulnerability, there is a need to improve cooperation, solidarity and trust in the 
Central and South-Eastern part of Europe (Commission, COM:2015:80, p. 10-11) 
The energy union is however also encapsulating areas inherently much closer to EU’s 
normative commitments than the ones above, such as “energy efficiency” (to achieve 
less pollution) and “emissions reduction”. Global environmental leadership is all 
things being equal a normative commitment close to EU and generally also its 
member states. (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 160-66; S. Lucarelli, L. Fioramonti, 2010, p. 23). 
Thus, these policy areas along with the normative elements of solidarity, common 
visions etc. also very present in the rhetoric of “secure supplies” and “internal energy 
	   13	  
market” encourages us to believe Normative Institutionalism can be used to analyze 
policy areas not traditionally or as closely associated with EU normative actorness.  
 
Secondly we will argue that circumstances of international energy politics are 
currently in a state that encourages the use of a theory, which has idealistic and 
normative expectations for actors to engage in an institutional setting on energy 
matters. What shall in particular be noted is the political energy landscape subsequent 
to the 2014 Crimean crisis and the renewed focus on the need for diversification, 
which has been evident ever since.  
According to Transatlantic Academy analyst T. Boearma, the event that in our time 
truly changed European energy landscape was the Russian annexation of Crimea. It 
created a renewed urgency for the creation of a truly collaborative European energy 
policy. It furthermore reawakened the old and ongoing debate about the implications 
and dangers of the dependence on Russian energy (T. Boerma, 2015, p. 1). This 
resulted in many declarations from Member State leaders on the need for collective 
diversification away from Russian natural gas. He continues to underline that 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has seized this “opportunity” created by 
the fear of energy disruptions among the Member States to finally get a proper energy 
policy in place (T. Boerma, 2015, p. 1). Similarly the Atlantic Councils D. Koranyi 
argues that apart from the reinforcement of the problems associated with Russian 
dependence the crisis also initiated and provided ground for discussing new and 
common approaches to the EU energy security (D. Koranyi, 2014, p. 3-8). From the 
Commission it is also evident that the energy landscape might be in a state that finally 
calls for a drastic new approach, as the need for security has become “ever more 
pressing”. It has especially become more apparent after the Crimean annexation that 
uncoordinated national policies, and the absence of a common stance on external 
energy relations is the real obstacle for any progress in the field. It has been proposed 
that the most effective response to these contemporary challenges is a more cohesive 
set of measures across policy areas and at EU and national levels (Commission, 2015, 
MEMO/15/4485). 
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5.4. Internal & External Validity: 
 
Internal & external validation of a theory cannot merely be answered through a 
falsification or a confirmation, it is not positive or negative, but rather a degree of 
validity. The validation of a given theory is thus not measured through a set of facts, 
but is analyzed and is thus evaluated through a continuum from low to high 
(University of New England, 2000). 
This section will grasp the internal and external validity of the applied theory – 
Normative Institutionalism – in relation to the topic of the project, and in accordance 
with other theories on the research area of international relations. Thus it will be 
outlined how Normative Institutionalism has validity to the case. And how other 
theories are opposing or supporting the stance of Normative Institutionalism. 
 
As we have presented in the section of the choice of theory, the theory of Normative 
Institutionalism is very applicable in terms of supporting the possibility of a lessened 
dependence on Russia, thus it might seem like a very supportive theory towards the 
creation and establishment of the Energy Union. Additionally in accordance with the 
internal validity there are strong connections with the normative institutionalism and 
the general and current processes in the European Union, in terms of norms and state 
behavior (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 349). Normative Institutionalism also seem 
appropriate in terms of describing the current political situation in which the EU is 
enhancing its gathered norms in order to propose this Energy Union.  
 
On the other hand, the external validity of Normative Institutionalism is being 
challenged to a rather high degree from opposing theories. Previously it has been 
addressed how other theories is opposing the perspective of Normative 
Institutionalism, namely evolving around the theory of Intergovernmentalism.  
The theory of Realism, which is one of the grand theories, is also challenging the 
Normative Institutionalism with a perception of the world, which establishes a great 
support for the idea of states being greatly self-interested in international relations, 
and thus will not engage in policies where there a no direct positive effects (O. 
Daddow, 2013, p. 108). It can also be argued that liberalism or neo-liberalism has a 
higher degree of validity, as the concept of interdependence is deriving directly from 
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the theory of Neo-liberalism, a branching theory of the grand theory; Liberalism (O. 
Daddow, 2013, p. 85). 
 
These are propositions, which is either challenging the basis of the normative 
institutionalism theory, or is arguably more applicable on the issue in terms of 
explaining the situation evolving around the Energy Union.  
Thus with a historical empirical perspective, there are more influential grand theories 
on the matter who are challenging the stance of Normative Institutionalism on the 
issues of interdependence and state behavior in intergovernmental organizations. 
 
In conclusion it can be argued that the internal validity of the Normative 
Institutionalism is high. The theory is directly applicable in terms of explaining the 
current situation in the European Union. Normative Institutionalism is thus explaining 
the norms and state behavior embedded in the current energy policies of the EU (D. 
C. Thomas, 2009, p. 343).  
The external validity is on the other hand being roughly challenged through other 
grand theories that are opposing some of the main assertions and perceptions of 
Normative Institutionalism. This will furthermore be addressed in the discussion, in 
which we will challenge our choice of a theory through the arguments of other 
reputable theories in the area of international relations. 
 
6. Methodological analytical design from Normative Institutionalism 
This section presents our analytical design and how we will methodologically utilize 
Normative Institutionalism to investigate our problem. It will explain how we will 
analyze normative actorness as a decisive factor in the Energy Unions goals of less 
Russian energy dependency and to which degree such a normative contribution is 
under development and could have effect. 
 
6.1. Actor models: 
 
Having established why we believe Normative Institutionalism provides the necessary 
framework to analyze our problem it should now be presented what exact actor 
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expectations the theory presents and how these will help us to answer our problem. 
These are inspired primarily from D.C. Thomas’s hypotheses that explain policy 
outcomes in terms of entrapment and cooperative bargaining dynamics. These are 
based on the very central theoretical claim that the "likelihood that the EU will adopt 
a common policy on a given issue, as well as the content of that policy, thus depend 
upon both the distribution of preferences among the Member States and how EU 
norms affect their choices in pursuit of those preferences” (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 
345). The following two hypotheses, which in the words of the author are 
“complementary but not necessarily interdependent”, specify this central expectation. 
It is necessary for us to outline these hypotheses as they will have a prominent role in 
our analysis as its terms and expectations will be used as tools to analyze Member 
State actorness. It should however also be noted that we do not wish to either prove or 
disprove any of the hypotheses, as our project concerns a not yet concluded case and 
any conclusions based on the use of the hypotheses will be purely hypothetical, but 
however still rooted in the theory’s arguments. We use both the theory’s hypotheses 
based on the fact that they are complimentary and, as it will be explained, because 
they explain different scenarios in which the hypothesis are most likely to be true, 
when certain conditions are met. These conditions are important for us to examine in 
comparison to the conditions governing the Energy Union, and thereby with most 
theoretical evidence argue how alignment of Member State norms could contribute to 
the Energy Union’s effect on EU-Russia relations – and under what conditions. The 
conditions will be outlined subsequent to each hypothesis.  
 
The two hypotheses derived from Normative Institutionalism cooperative bargaining 
and entrapment, has a separate set of conditions required in order to increase their 
likelihood. Entrapment is associated with meeting 5 conditions, while cooperative 
bargaining requires 2 in order to be most likely. We did however choose to emphasize 
4 conditions applicable to both theories and leave out the condition of ‘determinacy’ 
included in the entrapment hypothesis.  
Normative Institutionalism argues that the conditions of determinacy and relevance or 
precedence and relevance are the theorized cause of agreement through entrapment in 
cases of divergent Member State preferences (D.C Thomas, 2009, p. 499). We 
decided to focus on the latter since we believe the conditions of relevance and 
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precedent is exceptionally relevant in or case of investigating energy politics in a 
broader context. 
 
6.2 Hypothesis 1 à  Entrapment is an explanation of how norms within EU affect 
policy-making. Policy preferences of different EU Member States may diverge on 
specific issues but the argument is that policy-making behavior of Member States is 
highly influenced by pre-existing EU norms and commitments. They thereby highly 
value coherence and consistency (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 345). The states whose 
preferences are seen as inconsistent with the EU’s norms are less willing to insist on 
their preferences and more likely to make compromises and follow the norm-
consistent policy. They expect the rewards for doing so will exceed the costs of 
compromise. As a result the Member States with the deviant preferences have 
committed themselves to a set of norms or policies they do not necessarily agree with. 
Those Member States now find themself entrapped, constrained to take further actions 
that does not correlate with their original intentions and preferences (Schimmelfennig, 
2001, 2003, 2004). Entrapment is most likely to happen in the occasion where states 
expect the future social rewards to exceed the costs of compromise. The struggle for 
Member States to avoid entrapment thus revolves around setting the negotiation 
agenda by highlighting an EU norm, which is conducive to its own interests. Other 
states might seek to oppose this by offering alternative norms intended to guide policy 
choices of other Member States. Diverging Member States who fail to comply with 
the alternative norms will thus be trapped in support of EU policies that diverge from 
their preferences (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 345).  When Member States has preferences 
that diverge from EU’s normative commitments this is termed “normative 
inconsistency”. This is subject to ‘rhetorical framing’ from the EU, which link, said 
policy proposal to pre-existing ideas and prior experiences. Framing a policy as 
consistent with the EU’s formal norms and prior policy commitments disempowers its 
opponents (or divergent Member States with “normative inconsistency”)(D. C. 
Thomas, 2009, p. 345). 
 Normative Institutionalism’s entrapment explanation can thus be represented as 
follows:  
Divergent Member State Preferences + Rhetorical framing à  Entrapment à  
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Norm-consistent policy (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 346). 
 
Entrapment is most likely to occur when several conditions are met: 
 
- C-1: Determinacy - When actors, regardless of their preferences, have little doubt 
about which norm applies to the issue at hand, which policy behavior it condones and 
which it condemns.  
- C-2: Precedent - When the EU has already made policy commitments on the issue at 
hand – that is, already invested its resources and reputation on behalf of a principle.  
- C-3: Relevance - When external conditions are consistent with the assumptions that 
underlay the existing EU norm or policy commitment.  
- C-4: Forum - When policy deliberation occurs within forums where EU norms and 
policy commitments are salient and thus exert strong compliance pull.  
- C-5: Publicity - When the issue under discussion has received significant public 
attention, which increases the likelihood that non-compliance with existing EU norms 
or policy commitments will be noticed and subject to disapproval (D.C. Thomas, 
2009, p. 346). 
 
6.3. Hypothesis 2 à  Cooperative Bargaining 
Similar to Entrapment, Cooperative bargaining also acknowledges the fact that there 
are divergent states and that all states do not have the same foreign policy preferences. 
The foreign policy negotiation process has however, through gradual evolvement of 
procedural norms of consultation and cooperation becomes “Europeanized”. This 
means that under foreign policy negotiation there will be an exchange of information 
between states, and a commitment to arrive at a common understanding and approach. 
This has become a norm in opposition to previous procedural norms of states acting 
from individual motive without consultation (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 347). The 
reinforcement of said new cooperative procedural norms will foster a cooperative 
approach to negotiations in the form of identification with common goals and values 
and trust in the dynamics of diffuse reciprocity – which means that states tend to 
remember the identities that are associated with common ties among the Member 
States and forget those identities which tend to result in conflict and disagreement in 
policy-making. This commitment from EU policymakers in the Member States to 
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arrive at a common position through cooperation is by D.C. Thomas associated with 
what many institutionalist scholars, especially Nuttall (1992) has termed the 
“consultation reflex” or ”consensus norm” (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 347) A collective 
goal is to reach an agreement that comes as close as possible to satisfying the 
preferences of all Member States. This deviates somehow from the Entrapment 
hypothesis, as entrapment would often occur at the expense of Member States who 
has committed themselves to norms they do not necessarily agree with. Under 
cooperative bargaining it is in a higher degree assumed that the policy will be shaped 
as a solution that is acceptable or ideal for the greatest number of Member States. In 
other words – mutual compromise as opposed to compromise by only a number of 
divergent states (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 348). Normative Institutionalism’s 
entrapment explanation can thus be represented as follows:  
Divergent Member State preferences + Consensus norm/Consultation reflex à  
Cooperative bargaining à  Mutual compromise policy (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 
348). 
 
Cooperative bargaining is most likely to occur when several conditions are met: 
 
- C-6: Forum – Exactly the same as C-4 in “entrapment”. 
-  C-7: Secrecy - when deliberations occur in camera – that is, away from the media 
spotlight that raises the domestic political costs of compromise. (Note that this is the 
exact opposite of entrapment’s C-5 (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 348). 
 
From the actor models it should be clear that the hypotheses outcome differ 
significantly from normative entrapment to cooperative bargaining. The former will 
creates foundation for a normatively consistent policy outcome  - and thereby also 
from the policy proposal framework – more successful subsequent political effect. 
The latter is ambitiously lower in its policy outcome as it will be formed through a 
mutual compromise solution, which would come as close as possible to satisfy the 
pre-existing preferences of all member states or at a level of acceptable or ideal for 
the greatest number of Member States (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 
494; D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 345-350). The determination of which hypothesis that fit 
the substantial and actual conditions governing the Energy Union creates the 
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arguments for the analysis of which elements that would under these conditions foster 
the greatest potential to change the Russia-EU relations. 
By investigating two hypotheses in an analytical design we must however evaluate 
their relationship and how we will conclude if any are true for the case circumstances. 
By working with differing hypotheses we aim to avoid the trap of “the ruling 
hypothesis” and instead for a research that will lead to the most realistically 
meaningful and theoretically relevant results by evaluating differing explanations in 
context. From the original theory it is evident that a policy negotiation process can 
contain elements of both normative entrapment and cooperative bargaining, and might 
not always be a clear cut process of one or the other (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. 
Thomas, 2009, p. 494). The end result of a policy can though be characterized from 
the above-mentioned outcomes to have been created through either H1 or H2. H1 
evidently requires more conditions met in order to come into effect while H2 only 
requires two conditions met. The conditions of “precedence” and “relevance” are not 
factors omitting the possibility of cooperative bargaining per se, but are merely not 
required for it to happen. On the other hand however, the existence of both 
“precedence” and “relevance” greatly increases the chances of entrapment to emerge 
instead of cooperative bargaining (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 494). 
In our analytical design the first step will thus be to determine if the conditions for 
entrapment are met. If not, the foundation for cooperative bargaining will be 
considered. Below the possible outcomes are outlined: 
 
- Outcome 1: Conditions for entrapment are weak or absent à cooperative 
bargaining is likely to happen if its conditions are met. The absence of conditions for 
entrapment is thus equally an increase of the likelihood of cooperative bargaining to 
emerge. 
- Outcome 2: Conditions for entrapment are strong or fulfilled à Entrapment is very 
likely to happen, while cooperative bargaining is less likely to happen.  
- Outcome 3: Conditions for entrapment are weak or absent + conditions for 
cooperative bargaining are weak or absent à both hypotheses falsified and alternative 
hypotheses explaining the policy negotiation process and outcome is required. 
We have considered the possibility that none of explanations may be correct and 
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analytically most important for us also the possibility that some new explanations may 
emerge through alternative theory. Even if H1 or H2 is true we will still test its 
validity through alternative theory. 
 
 
Illustration of the conditions for each hypothesis to be most likely to happen: 
 
 
H1 - Entrapment H2 – Cooperative 
Bargaining 
C1 – Precedent Significant Non-significant 
C2 – Relevance Significant Non-significant 
C3 – Forum EU-level EU-level 
C4 – Publicity / Secrecy Publicity Secrecy 
 
By having established what conditions that are, from the theory, expected to be most 
likely to foster collective normative commitments, we can now use these conditions in 
connection to our empirical and substantial material on the Energy Union. It is 
reasonable to argue that the theory proposes causality between the degree of 
fulfillment of the conditions and the likelihood of cooperation/entrapment. This 
causality will help us in two analytical directions as similarly proposed in the problem 
formulation.  
1) Explain how the existence of certain conditions will foster cooperation and 
normative commitments and how this could contribute to the successfulness of the 
Energy Union.à  
2) Create foundation to compare and analyze existing conditions to those proposed in 
the theory à from the hypothesis matching the conditions; propose our analysis for 
which elements that would, under these conditions, foster the greatest potential to 
change the Russia-EU relations à finally we will critically evaluate these findings in 
the light of opposing/contrasting theory. 
In order to investigate the conditions governing the Energy Union we will make use 
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of a variety of sources. Firstly we will include the EU institutions own presentation of 
the substantial elements of the Energy Union. These concerns mostly “precedence”, 
“forum” and “publicity/secrecy” as these are explainable in a context of EU 
publications and declarations. Secondly they will also be examined from the 
perspective of outside literature. These sources will most likely not use the rhetoric of 
Normative Institutionalism concerning the conditions, but will be examined in the 
Normative Institutional theoretical context. This will, very importantly, represent 
diverse and theoretically wide-reaching commentaries and interpretations. The 
examination of these different assessments and expectations will result in a 
discussion, which will help us to conclude on the degree of existence of these 
conditions. 
 
It is explicitly stated in our problem formulation that we wish to evaluate the degree 
to which the Energy Union has created, or could create, the necessary conditions 
under which alignment of Member State norms would be the essential and game-
changing factor in the EU-Russia Energy relations. In order to assess the before 
mentioned conditions it is necessary for us to establish a historical understanding of 
the course of EU-Russia Energy relations and how norms has previously developed in 
the Member States in this field of energy policy. This is necessary for us as we, in 
order to examine if the Energy Union, indeed is proposed in a time in history and 
under conditions where exactly alignment of Member State norms could be the factor, 
which distinguishes this EU policy action from previous attempts at increasing EU 
energy security. Embedded in this historical examination is the very important 
dimension. 
 
We have by now established two important assumptions. First we have established 
cooperation, adoption of EU norms and Member State identification with EU policy 
commitments to be essential to the successful implementation of the Energy Union. 
Second, we have established these specific necessities to be central in the expectations 
one, from Normative Institutionalism, could have towards Member State behavior. 
Following these assumptions we can ask a question very central to our problem 
formulation: Is there any reason to believe that the Energy Union provides both the 
timing and policy conditions for the actor expectations derived from Normative 
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Institutionalism to be evident? To answer this question we will use the historical 
examinations of the development of energy norms among Member States alongside 
the substantial elements and context of the currently proposed attempt at 
diversification in form of the Energy Union.  
 
 
 
7. EU-Russia historical energy relationship: 
 
In this section we wish to outline the historic relationship between Russia and EU in 
the energy field. The mutual ties date back to 1968 when Russia started supplying gas 
to Austria. We have nonetheless chosen to emphasize the interconnectedness after the 
fall of the communist regime in the late 80s and early 90s. The economic and 
normative bonds, created within this period are of great significance for the further 
evolvement of the mutual relationship and dependence (J. Hughes, 2006, p. 1). 
The relationship between Russia and the EU is shaped on both sides through 
calculated utility and norms, thus by consequences and appropriateness (J. G March & 
J. P Olsen, 1998, p. 4).  The relationship is as such arguably two fold e.g. loaded with 
considerations of cost and benefits of trade interdependence along with value-based 
issues like democratization, human rights etc. There has however through institutional 
developments in the EU such as the creation of the ‘Common Foreign and Security 
Policy’ been a tendency of an increased focus on economic cooperation at the expense 
of more normative issues (J. Hughes, 2006, p. 1). It was not until the 1980’s that more 
normative issues, such as sustainability and ecological objectives were beginning to 
gain political interest. These increased tremendously in the 2000’s and has been on 
the agenda ever since (J. McCormick, 2001, p. 21). 
 
The close cooperation between the two sides following the communist collapse, were 
somewhat characterized by an asymmetric interdependency. While the EU became 
highly dependent on Russian energy exports and required security and stability in this 
policy area, Russia had other important interests on its agenda. Russia were deeply 
concerned with bolstering the broader geo-strategic role of the EU as a counterpart to 
US influence in Europe, while furthermore developing a strong relationship with the 
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EU as a way of achieving recognition and legitimacy for post-communist regime 
changes in Russia (J. Hughes, 2006, p. 1).  
 
The communist collapse and the signing of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty boosted the 
impetus for heightened convergence in EU policy-making. The treaty were however 
more concerned with previous issues than the institutional changes required to handle 
post-communist Europe. The EU did subsequently expand into former Soviet-Blocs 
through EU and NATO enlargements. The enlargement of Finland (1995) and the 
Baltics (2004) made the EU and Russia territorial neighbors. The EU’s policies at this 
point revolved around a division of what countries in Europe were eligible for 
membership in the short term and those countries with a less potent prospect of 
membership.  The countries eligible for enlargement were provided with policies of 
integration and aid while the latter were offered policies of aid and cooperation 
respectively. The Maastricht Treaty did however emphasize that a more coordinated 
policy at the European level were needed in order to consolidate the changing nature 
of its bilateral relations with Russia (J. Hughes, 2006, p. 2).  
 
Throughout the 90s several policies at the EU level emphasized the partnership with 
Russia and addressed the growing energy dependency. In order to coordinate policies 
on Russia several instruments were developed, including the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (1994) and the Common Strategy (1999) among other 
initiatives (J. Hughes, 2006, p.2). 
 
From 2000 and onwards the policies on EU-Russia relations has been marked by a 
clear division between Member States. The older Member States whose foreign policy 
goals prioritize stable economic relations and strategic partnerships with Russia. The 
more recent Member States whose historically rooted resentment and concerns of 
Russia combined with an enhanced willingness to let the US exert influence, guides 
their foreign policies towards Russia as an exploiter of normative issues such as 
democratization and human rights (J. Hughes, 2006, p.2). Even though the European 
Union was founded on the basis of energy cooperation the Member States have still 
not transferred their competences in the field of energy to the community. The EU 
does as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union signed in Rome in 1958 
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art. 4(2)(i) suggests, only possess shared competences on energy policy (TFEU, 2012, 
Article 4(2)(i)). The EU is thus unable to intervene with individual preferences in the 
field of energy.   
 
An example of the diverse preferences within the EU in relation to Energy import is 
present in regards to Germany and Poland. Germany did especially under Chancellor 
Schroeder establish close ties with Russia and had a wish to preserve or even enhance 
this relationship. On the other hand Poland and the Baltic countries have been trying 
to provide energy security and reducing dependence on Russia through diversification 
and the formation of a common position in the field.  
 
When Germany and Russia in 2005 signed an agreement on the construction of a 
direct gas pipeline connection running under the Baltic Sea, Germany made it clear 
that preserving Russia as a major energy supplier corresponded to its direct interests. 
Poland and Lithuania who were bypassed with this new gas pipeline experienced this 
project as a major threat to their energy security and declared that Germany had 
neglected the interests of other Member States and as such did not follow the 
coordinated strategy of the EU (COM (2006)(0105).  From Poland’s point of view the 
realization of this pipeline called the ‘Nord Stream’ would divide energy security and 
thus undermine the principle of solidarity and prospects of a future common energy 
policy.  
 
This sort of intra-EU disagreements has characterized the debate in the energy field, 
arguably due to a lack of coherency in the policies and inconsistency in the 
relationship between EU-norms contra strategic partnerships. The decision of 
Germany to create the Nord Stream did however ignite an enhanced debate about the 
possibility for the EU to create a common energy policy.  
Hence, the Member States depend on the import of energy resources to a different 
extent. The majority of the more recent Member States that entered the EU in 2004 
and 2007 depends heavily on import of energy resources from Russia mostly due to 
historical and geographical reasons. Countries such as Bulgaria, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia import of natural gas and a greater part of oil comes 
from Russia. Countries such as France and Italy do currently posses greater potential 
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and Resources in order to reach a sufficient level of diversification of energy supplies. 
(S. Keukeleire, 2008, p. 261-262).  
Despite these differences in Member State preferences that might interfere with the 
creation of a common policy, it is possible from EU-rhetoric in the field to derive 
certain optimism. A hope that national distinctions will disappear in a long-term 
prospect due to the creation of a common market and the regulatory convergences 
implemented has grown to be common discourse within the EU institutions. 
Furthermore, the evolving protectionism e.g. of Poland and France in relation to their 
respective energy industries could be regarded as a reaction to lessen dependence on 
Russian energy and turn towards their European neighbors (H. Wallace, et. al., 2005, 
p. 430-435).  
The Member States of the EU have one common feature, dependence on import of 
gas and oil to some extent. This dependence has over the years developed into being 
considered a threat to energy security. The most current discourse on EU energy 
policy, especially deriving from the commission, and state leaders is a rhetorical focus 
on moving in the direction of a common energy policy, which will facilitate an 
achievement of their common goals and purposes. The European Commission has 
declared that the previous approach aimed at including the individual energy policies 
of each Member State will not work sufficiently (R. Zajdler, 2012 p. 139). The belief 
is that through uniting Member States efforts the EU can render more influence and 
get involved in projects that are relevant to their common interests. The EU did 
previously rely on the well functioning of markets to provide the necessary security of 
supplies required. But since the EU historically has become increasingly dependent on 
energy supplies from Russia where energy resources belong to state-owned 
companies, there is a growing mutual recognition that a common energy policy is 
necessary. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel did at a EU summit argue that there 
is an intensified need for diversification of energy imports. Despite Germany’s close 
ties to Russia, she acknowledged that fostering closer ties with countries from North 
Africa and the Middle- East would be beneficial for the EU. She did however bypass 
the issue of granting energy regulatory powers to the EU institutions (R. Zajdler, 
2012, p. 139). 
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The policies implemented by the EU in its foreign energy relations since the 
communist collapse has thus led to the current interconnectedness with major energy 
suppliers like Russia. The notion that a common European policy would be beneficial 
for the Member States in diversifying imports and thus lessen dependence on foreign 
imports has been further developed. The recent proposal by the Commission to create 
a united Energy Union is the most recent product of this rhetoric. However the EU has 
not, until recently, established a set of norms on the issue of common energy policies. 
Until 2007 most Member States vetoed such proposals because they would rather 
exploit their energy advantages than to share them with the EU. But in the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2007 the Member States endorsed in the energy action plan being “An 
energy policy for Europe”, proposed by the Commission. Thus the Lisbon Treaty in 
2007 was the first time the EU reached consensus on the common energy policies 
(Parliament: Green European Foundation, 2011, p. 6).  
The Energy Union has become even more relevant with regards to recent events in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. In the following section there will be an elaboration of 
the Crimean crisis, and how this might have affected the EU’s energy policies.  
8. The Crimean Crisis 
In order to fully grasp how the Energy Union is linked to Russia, it is important to 
have an adequate knowledge of the recent historical perspective, which has been 
leading up towards the proposal of the Energy Union. Thus we have made a section 
on the historical energy relationship between Russia and the European Union, but in 
recent time the Crimean crisis has been defining the need for Europe to diversify its 
energy sources of supply (Parliament, 2014). 
The Crimean crisis was concerning the Russian occupation of the Ukrainian peninsula 
of Crimea. Crimea has throughout history been Russian, but was handed as a political 
gift to the Ukraine. However in February 2014 Russian president Vladimir Putin sent 
in Russian soldiers with the goal of reuniting the Crimean peninsula with Russia. 
The hostile takeover did not cohere with the set of norms outlined by the EU on how 
its neighboring countries was supposed to act, resulting in a conflict between the 
European Union and Russia, on the issue of the hostile occupation of Crimea. As a 
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result of EU opposing Russia’s plans of occupying Crimea, Putin sent a letter to the 
European Union stating that he would cut off the gas supplies for the 18 EU countries 
who are dependent on the pipelines going through Ukraine, adding that he was aware 
that “Undoubtedly, this is an extreme measure. We fully realize that this increases the 
risk of siphoning off natural gas passing through Ukraine's territory and heading to 
European consumers” (Parliament, 2014). 
This caused the European Commission to request a meeting on diversifying the 
energy sources of supply to the European Union, and thus is the link between the 
dimension of Secure Supplies, outlined in the Energy Union, and the Crimean crisis 
of 2014 (Parliament, 2014). 
9. The EU Energy Union 
 
The European Union is facing a pressing need to secure sustainable, affordable and 
competitive energy for the future. The excessive dependence on numerous supply 
sources, especially natural gasses from outside the European Union, is a problem for 
the European Union as the Union is rather exposed to supply disruptions, if the 
relationship with the supplier for example bursts because of political disagreements 
(Commission, 2015).  
 
The Energy Union is rather based on the three long-established objectives of the 
European Unions energy policy: Security of Supply, Sustainability and 
Competitiveness. In order for the European Union to reach these three objectives, the 
Energy Union has a main focus of five mutually reinforcing dimensions; Secure 
Supplies, Internal Energy Market, Energy Efficiency, Emissions Reduction, and 
Research and Innovation in Energy (Commission, 2015). 
These are the five dimensions of the Energy Union, which are to be understood as the 
trademarks of the common energy policy that is to be implemented into the norms of 
the European Union. 
 
Although there are five dimensions of the Energy Union, we have chosen to focus 
primarily on the diversification of the energy source supplies. This is mostly related to 
the dimensions of Secure Supplies & Internal Energy Market, and thus our focus is 
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these two dimensions, as they are the ones that are in relation to our problem field and 
problem formulation. 
The Secure Supplies cover the aspect of the diversification of energy suppliers and 
resources, so the EU is not solely dependent on a very limited amount of resources 
and therefore also is not secured in terms of having a very high dependency on for 
example the political relationship with Russia. 
 
The Internal Energy Market addresses the free-flow of the energy within the European 
Union, allowing competitors the same conditions for their energy import and exports, 
and thus allowing a diversification throughout the European Union. 
 
Thus, with the EU’s import which rounds 53% of the consumed energy. With some 
Member States being fully dependent on the gas imports of one main supplier, the 
energy diversification is a key mean of improving the energy security within the 
European Union. 
 
Through the Energy Union, the EU wish to explore and add new supply regions for 
fuels, and in general take firm action on further development of indigenous resources 
and improving the infrastructure to ease the access to the new sources of supply. This 
is a main focus in order to conduct the energy diversification, which can be argued as 
a breaking point in the new Energy Union (Commission, 2015). 
 
As our analytical vanishing point is focused on the EU-Russia energy relations we 
have chosen to focus on the dimensions of secure supplies and the internal energy 
market as these can be argued to have direct effect on the Russian import quota in that 
secure supplies will secure imports from other sources and the internal energy market 
will further the pooling of resources internally and thereby lessen Russian dependence 
(Commission, 2015). The other dimensions of energy efficiency, emission reduction 
and research an innovation and energy will though also have a minor role in our 
project, as we will argue that these have indirect on the relationship. A commitment to 
these dimensions from the member states will contribute to the total supports of the 
Energy Union and thereby the chances of the other dimensions to be successful. 
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10. Analysis: 
 
10.1. C1 - Precedence: 
 
The theoretical sections have outlined how precedence is one of the conditions for 
entrapment to overcome policy divergences, but the absence of precedence would not 
exclude the possibility of cooperative bargaining. According to this condition it would 
thus be more likely for entrapment to occur when the EU has already made policy 
commitments to the goals visible from the Energy Union and has invested its 
resources and reputation on behalf of the principles or party involved in the issue at 
hand.  
In analyzing precedence we must take into account that the level of precedence is not 
equal along all the policy areas in the Energy Union. It can be argued that the issue or 
principle at hand is indeed a broad range of issues and principles collected under the 
umbrella of visions in the Energy Union –secure supplies, the internal energy market, 
energy efficiency, emissions reduction and research/innovation in energy – and must 
then be analyzed as such. Although these are separate policy areas it can be argued 
that they have through the years become more and more interrelated. This 
interrelatedness in the energy union is the most recent example of the 
interconnectivity, but previous policy initiatives and strategies has also rhetorically 
been framed in a way that connects these dimensions under one. Recent major 
resolutions which falls under this rhetorical framing of connectivity includes most 
prominently “A strategic approach to secure, sustainable and competitive energy 
supply” (P7_TA(2012)0238), the Energy Roadmap 2050, a future with energy 
(P7_TA(2013)0088) and the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies (T7-
0088/2013)(European Parliament: Energy Policy: General Principles, 2015, p. 4).  
The former energy policies proposes that a common external energy policy based on 
solidarity, diversification and strategic cooperation in respect to energy efficiency, 
internal cooperation and emission reduction would create synergies helping to ensure 
security of supply for the EU furthermore enhance the EU’s capacity for foreign 
policy. This would be due to a precedence of strong normative commitment to green 
and sustainable energy solutions, with the EU acting as a catalyzer for the Member 
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States to engage in the areas related (Parliament, 2014). The Energy Roadmap 2050 
furthers this understanding of the policy areas as a “package” and the importance of 
previous commitments. In implementing environmental and climate policies it must 
be done in collaboration with challenges such as energy security and market 
integration. This creates a connection between areas where the EU norm of 
commitment is widely understood and more recent strong commitments such as 
secure supplies. The precedence of normative commitments in the Energy Union 
could thus create incentive for more controversial subjects as new import routes and 
market solidarity to gain support in the Member States (Parliament, 2014, p. 3-7; D. 
C. Thomas, 2009, p. 343-46).  
The precedence of the legal framework concerning secure supplies is also evident in 
the Energy Union’s goals. The Member State competences on energy is not center to 
any drastic changes as the sovereignty on defining the national energy mix would be 
kept intact, though with strong incentive to maintain a “spirit of solidarity” when it 
comes to energy security (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, art. 194(2). The Energy Union 
would ensure that Member States implement and enforce existing legislature, most 
importantly directives and recommendations. Full implementation and strict 
enforcement of existing energy and related legislation is thus, according to the Energy 
Union Strategy, of first priority in order for the project to succeed (European 
Commission COM(2015)80, 2015, p. 9;European Commission – Citizens Summary, 
2015, p. 2; TFEU, 2012, art. 4(2)(i); art. 122; art. 170-72). The identification with the 
legal foundation would thus according to the condition of precedence be important in 
order for identify with this new policy initiative. There exists a recurring focus on 
designing the Policy in order for Member States to, in the highest degree possible, 
utilize the existing national strengths in a manner that also includes solidarity 
transnationally.  
The Energy Roadmap 2050 Stresses that basing the energy systems of EU Member 
States on their own energy resources, and on their ability to access them, is an 
essential pillar of the EU’s energy security (Parliament, 2014, p. 8). This assumption 
is reappearing in the Energy Union Strategy, but characterized by the rhetorical 
framing of solidarity where transnational.  Concerning the latter resolution, it is stated 
in the 2030 policy framework future successful energy’s security policies should 
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strike a balance between implementing measures at EU level and ways, which are 
most appropriate to national circumstances, while of course being consistent with 
normative commitments (Commission COM(2013)169, 2013, p. 9). It can be argued 
that resources has indeed been invested in the normative and policy commitments 
presented in the Energy Union as all the covered areas has more or less been on the 
EU agenda for a long time. In summary all of the above policy areas traces back to the 
clear description of the EU’s energy policy aims of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. These 
are as following to ensure the functioning of the energy market, ensure security of 
energy supplies, promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of 
new and renewable forms of energy and promote the interconnection of energy 
networks. It is clear from these aims that they are identical to the ones presented in the 
Energy Union. It can thus be argued that the Energy Union is a clear enactment of 
these aims and precedence of these policy areas can be said to exist (Parliament: 
Energy Policy: General Principles, 2015, p. 2). 
Concerning the investment of reputation it can also be argued that indeed in time 
leading up to the Energy Union, the EU had invested its reputation in a high degree in 
its action towards Russia, well-knowing that it could result in destabilization of the 
energy relations. In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea the EU has 
suspended talks on new EU-Russia agreement while most EU-Russia cooperation 
programs have also been suspended. It can be argued that the EU (to a certain degree) 
has valued normative commitments before energy-relations or at least taken a step 
towards countering the leverage Russia has on the EU in Energy trade (European 
Union External Action Service (EEAS), 2015, p.1).  At the very least the crisis in 
Crimea and the following effect on the EU-Russia relations can be seen as a 
development and push towards the creation of strengthened energy security policies in 
the EU. 
 
Concluding we feel it is fair to assume the condition of precedence as existing as EU 
has already made policy commitments on the issue at hand by investing its resources 
and reputation on behalf of the policy. 
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10.2. C-2: Relevance 
As with the other conditions, it is important to investigate the degree of significance 
in the relevance of the policy proposals of the Energy Union. We must do so in order 
to determine whether the hypothesis of Entrapment or Cooperative Bargaining is the 
one most likely to happen. As we are having a primary focus on the dimensions of the 
Internal Energy Market and the Secure Supplies, it is also those dimensions that are 
the focus when analyzing relevance. 
 
The EU has in a historical perspective always been a huge importer of energy from 
states outside of the Union. Since the 1980’s the relevance of the issues of 
sustainability and ecology has been rapidly rising, and with the Energy Union 
proposing a lessen usage of fossil fuels it comes very suitable to the energy goals of 
2020 (Commission, 2015; J. McCormick, 2001, p. 21). The possibility of 
accommodating these goals is also a driving force behind the urgency of the Energy 
Union. According to Jean-Arnold Vinois, EU Energy adviser, the cornerstone of the 
current EU energy policy is the Internal Energy Market, and in order for EU to reach 
its full energy potential and accommodate with the 2020 energy goals, the Internal 
Energy Market needs to be a high priority (EurActiv, 2015).  
As the sustainable energy policies is a very implemented norm in the European Union 
it is also important to reach the goals set on such areas, in order for the EU to conform 
with the goals outlined in the 2020 Energy Package. 
 
Thus we have outlined some of the relevant internal conditions. The external 
conditions are primarily concerning the relationship with Russia, and how this might 
have been affected in recent history, and if this might have had an impact on the 
proposal of diversifying the energy supplies of the European Union.  
In the published factsheet on the Energy Union, published by the Commission, the 
Commission states that the EU needs to diversify their energy supplies because of the 
EU being one of the largest energy importers in the world, with an energy import of 
around 53% and with an estimated budget exceeding 400 billion Euros a year 
(Commission, 2015). This might lead the thoughts towards the Energy Union being 
proposed as a result of the sanctions in relation to the Crimean crisis. The following of 
the Crimean crisis has lead to a lot of discussion on whether or not the EU has a 
	   34	  
preference of diminishing their energy interdependence with Russia, which is an 
external condition rooting for the relevance of the Energy Union to be of great 
significance, and is therefore supporting the outcome of an entrapment hypothesis 
(Parliament, 2014). However, there has been experts from energy and climate 
divisions of the Centre for European Policy Studies postulating to raise the question 
on whether or not the Energy Union becomes a platform for anti-Russian sentiments 
and action (C. Egenhofer, 2014, p. 4).  
 
Yet the European Council decided on March 21st 2014 that status of the Russian 
occupation of Crimea is leading to a connection with the energy security of the 
European Union, as Russia is a main source of energy supplies for the European 
Union. These precautions led to a request in June 2014 from the Commission on a 
comprehensive plan to reduce EU energy dependency (Parliament, 2014). 
 
Thus the external conditions created through the Crimean crisis are resulting in a 
reinforced commitment from the EU, on the matter of diminishing the energy 
interdependence with Russia. The relevance of the Energy Union seems significant, 
and so the entrapment hypothesis is most likely to be the outcome of the matter. 
 
10.3. C-3: Forum 
 
The Forum in which legislation on EU energy negotiations are conducted is relevant 
in order to assess the likelihood of the occurrence of entrapment and/or cooperative 
bargaining. The energy union is a product of negotiations within the European 
Commission. The Commission is definitely a forum where EU norms and policy 
commitments are salient and procedural norms exist. Furthermore they are 
institutionally considered to be representing the interests of the EU as a whole 
(Commission, 2015).  Since the policy deliberation has transpired within a forum 
dedicated to enhance EU norms and policy commitments through legislative 
proposals, the likelihood of entrapment and cooperative bargaining is arguably 
present. Previous cases conducted within a normative framework suggest that there is 
a strong relationship between entrapment, cooperative bargaining and cases that 
transpire within EU forums (D.C Thomas, 2009 p. 499). 
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The ambitious plan of an Energy Union has yet to be approved by the European 
Parliament and the Member States. The forum thus extends and expands beyond the 
institutional framework of the Commission and the Parliament.  
The likelihood of entrapment to occur decreases when discussions and negotiation 
occur intergovernmentally, since EU norms and policy commitments are less salient 
in a forum of 28 individual Member States with differing preferences and norms 
concerning the field of energy. These differences will be discussed under 
intergovernmental conferences, and intra-EU negotiations. Before making such major 
proposals the Commission consults widely in order to include stakeholders views and 
take them into account. Generally an assessment of the potential economic, social and 
environmental impact of such a proposal is published in order for Member States to 
decide on sufficient grounds (EU Commission, 2015).  
 
There are nonetheless, in our opinion sufficient conditions to support both the 
entrapment and cooperative bargaining hypotheses, since the proposal derives directly 
from EU institutions with an explicit aim towards enhancing EU norms and policy 
commitments in order to exert a strong compliance pull of the entrained parties.  
 
10.4. C-4: Publicity: 
 
Publicity as a condition increasing the likelihood of entrapment concerns the level of 
public attention the issue under discussion have received. In our case the issue at hand 
is the proposal of an Energy Union, and the institutional commitment to carry it out 
(D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 346).     
 
The Energy Union has due to current circumstances in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
become extremely relevant. The acknowledgement by EU that diversification of its 
energy imports is a pressing issue, has resurfaced in its rhetoric on the field of energy. 
The Energy Union is an ambitious effort and the Commission has been explicit about 
the possible benefits Member States would be able to reap if implemented, and the 
imminent need to lessen dependence on foreign suppliers (Commission, 2015). There 
is furthermore a current wish not to be associated with Russia, due to their actions in 
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Ukraine. This issue is of a certain magnitude, and not easy to overcome due to close 
established ties developed over the previous decades. Even though the Crimean crisis 
publicly has been more associated with politics and breach of international law, there 
is a clear emphasis in EU rhetoric on energy security.  
 
In the light of the current enhanced focus on energy security and the significant public 
attention it has received, a normative European institutional policy commitment is 
apparent. There is according to the condition of publicity an increased likelihood that 
non-compliance with existing EU-norms or policy commitments will be noticed and 
subject to disapproval (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 346).  Furthermore, in a combination of 
conditions, there is strong evidence for the expectation that entrapment is most likely 
when negotiations transpire within EU forums and when publicity is high. This 
tendency is by D.C. Thomas proven through 14 different case studies of foreign 
policy negotiations in EU (D.C. Thomas, 2009, p. 499; F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. 
Thomas, 2009, p. 491). 
 
The EU-norms in the field of energy is clearly evident in the Commission’s proposal 
of an Energy Union, and is specifically relevant in the light of recent events. There is 
as such an expectation that non-compliance with the norms or policy commitments 
expressed in the current EU-rhetoric on energy will be noticed and perhaps ill 
received. Such (in-) action would in a setting of publicity increase the chances of 
Member States avoiding such non-compliance in a higher degree than if the 
negotiations occurred under secrecy (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 
493).  
 
Entrapment in relation to this condition is likely to occur, since it correlates with the 
required public attention. In relation for the hypothesis of cooperative bargaining to 
be more likely, secrecy is a necessity as the complete opposite of publicity. 
Cooperative bargaining is as such most likely to occur when deliberations occur away 
from the media’s spotlight that raises the domestic political costs of compromise (D.C 
Thomas, 2009, p. 348). In our case of the Energy Union, there has as argued above 
been an increased internal focus on energy security due to current circumstances in 
Eastern Ukraine. The need to diversify energy imports, enhance sustainable energy 
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etc. has been given a great deal of both internal and external focus. The Energy Union 
is the latest effort to provide the necessary answers to these issues, and the European 
institutions have been quite explicit in this matter of affairs.  
 
Our argument in relation to this condition of cooperative bargaining is that, there has 
been too much public attention on the Energy Union in order for it to qualify as a 
matter of secrecy. The likelihood of cooperative bargaining to emerge as a policy 
outcome is less likely than entrapment in this context, and the hypothesis is unlikely 
according to this condition.      
         
Our findings from each evaluation of the conditions is illustrated below, where a “+” 
indicates which hypothesis each condition indicates as most likely to occur. As “C3 – 
Forum” is identical in both hypotheses they have both been given the same score. 
Only the lack of compliance with the condition C3 would have had any impact on the 
likelihood of both and it can thus be seen as encouraging for both the hypotheses. As 
our findings proved “C1 - Precedent” and “C-2 – Relevance” to be fulfilled it does in 
the case of divergent member state preferences as theorized by F. Schimmelfennig 
and D. C. Thomas create incentive for agreement through entrapment (F. 
Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 496). Furthermore we concluded that “C-4 
– Publicity/Secrecy” in our case was a definite example of publicity on national, 
international and institutional level. This is as described a factor denoting the 
possibility of cooperative bargaining and greatly increasing the chances of 
entrapment. We can thus from our examination conclude “Outcome 2” and thereby 
Hypothesis “H1- Entrapment” to be true in our case. Entrapment thus creates 
foundation for a normatively much more consistent policy outcome and consequently 
more ground for improvement in the goal of diversification and secure supplies. We 
will also argue that especially relevance can be seen as one of the most, if not the 
most, radically changed factor in a historical perspective. This condition alongside the 
publicity which both underlying the Crimean crisis, the abruption of gas imports and 
the focus on renewable/efficient energy has generated has furthermore given us 
incentive to conclude entrapment as most likely (J. McCormick, 2001, p. 21). 
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H1 - Entrapment H2 – Cooperative 
Bargaining 
C1 – Precedent +  
C2 – Relevance +  
C3 – Forum + + 
C4 – Publicity / Secrecy +  
 
The following sections will take our conclusions in two analytical directions. First, we 
will from our conclusions on actor behavior corresponding to entrapment critically 
evaluate which exact elements in the Energy Union that could, from these conclusions 
be groundbreaking in de-escalating Russian energy dependence. Our product of the 
following analysis will thus be a revision of what we believe to be the groundbreaking 
policy elements in the Energy Union, but all notions will be rooted in already existing 
legislature and policy plans on the Energy Union. Second, we will evaluate these 
findings by challenging them with opposing or contrasting theory in order to discover 
alternative explanations for both why cooperation might or might not prevail, and also 
why or why not the found elements could actually be groundbreaking. It is 
furthermore very important to note that the theory of Normative Institutionalism 
would only hold true in the case that the Energy Union ends up being completely 
agreed upon between Member States through either entrapment or cooperative 
bargaining. As the hypothesis of entrapment is now assumed this will be the 
foundational approach to the conditions governing the Energy Union.  
 
10.5. Energy Union policy evaluation: 
 
10.5.1. Common regulatory framework – creation of regional operational centers: 
Given the incentive we have established for Member States to value coherence and 
consistency in a given policy we could expect the plans of a common regulatory 
framework to correlate with level of ambition expected for Member State behavior. A 
common regulatory framework is a prominent goal of the “3rd Internal Energy 
Market Package” adopted in 2009, which in particular regards unbundling and the 
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independence of regulators as top priorities – that is firstly, implement effective 
management of infrastructure by independent Transmission System Operators, which 
should prevent network operators from favoring their own energy production and 
supply companies, and secondly making regulatory authorities independent from the 
interest of the energy industry (Commission MEMO/11/125, 2011, p. 1-4; 
Commission COM(2015)80, 2015, p. 9). It is clear that a realization of such 
development requires a drastic shift from intergovernmental decision-making to a 
more supranational approach, which has historically proven difficult in this area. (H. 
B. Stiftung, 2011, p. 3-7). Such conferral of powers would however from our 
analytical framework provide great opportunity for the EU to steer Member States in 
a common direction, given that our established actor expectations are correct.  
The Member States has already committed themselves to apply the regulations and 
transpose the two Directives into national law, and it would though be expected that 
Member States find themselves constrained to take actions that do not reflect the 
original intend of the package (D. C. Thomas, 2009, 345-46).  However, the original 
intend of the Package to set up bodies to ensure cooperation among transmission 
system operators and regulators has not succeed entirely. The decisions made in these 
established bodies do still reflect national views, and this problem should indeed be 
center to change in order for the functioning of an internal energy market 
(COM(2015)80, 2015, p. 9). We have concluded that we believe internal/external 
conditions creates foundation to believe that such tendency could very well finally be 
center to supranational change, with especially precedent and relevance as vital 
factors. This is an area in which resources have already been invested, and the 
intentions of such regulations and directives are not unknown to the Member States. 
Its current relevance is arguably reason to except a higher degree of alignment of 
Member State commitments than before. This is based on the argument of a pan-
European approach to regulatory frameworks, where energy mixes and imports are 
exchanged and decided on a basis of supply and demand rather than national interests 
(D. D. BiŠvre, 2007, p. 122). A common approach guided by regulatory authorities 
would greatly enhance EU’s energy security. This would demolish the supremacy of 
national decisions, which would harm the common interest of the EU - like 
normatively unwelcomed import-decisions as excessive Russian dependence (P. V. 
Gault, 2004, 177).  The creation of a supranational regional operational center would 
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thus from our theoretical foundation and on the recommendation from EU be vital for 
the internal energy market and secure supplies to have an effect on its foreign, and 
hereunder Russian relations (COM(2015)80, 2015, p. 7-10; L. Meeus & N. KeyAerts, 
2014, p. 2-6). The criteria, which still need improvement in order for a common 
regulatory framework to successfully enable EU to act more united in energy matters, 
as mentioned in Energy Union Strategy, are very compatible and likely under an 
entrapment approach. 
From the Energy Union Strategy it is first priority that existing energy and related 
registration is enforced. In this context they include most importantly the Treaty 
provisions on energy, the two Directives under the 3rd Internal Energy Market 
Package; (2009/73/EC), (2009/72/EC) and three Regulations ((EC) No 715/2009), 
((EC) No 714/2009) and very prominently ((EC) No 713/2009) on the establishment 
of The Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). The Commission will 
in this regard use all available policy instruments and will insist that Member States 
fully implement and enforce the related legislature, as common commitment is vital 
(COM (2015) 80, 2015, p. 9-10). We have from entrapment reason to believe that the 
rhetorical framing in the strategy of legislative consistency would enhance the 
implementation of these legislative acts under the act of the Energy Union. 
Compliance with EU energy legislations is vital in this connection. It is thus important 
that potential future directives and regulations in common regulatory frameworks are 
proposed in terms of pre-existing norms and commitments consistent with EU and 
consequently Member State policy preferences (D. C. Thomas, 2009, 345). 
Legislative implementation and consistency are though not the only steps needed in 
order for the internal market to have a direct effect on energy diversification. The 
creation and execution of regional operational centers will have to be carried out in a 
way that allows them to effectively plan and manage cross-border electricity and gas 
flows (M. Derdevet, 2015, p. 3). The before-mentioned Agency for Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) was established for that exact purpose. ACER was one of 
the established bodies, by the 3rd Internal Energy Market Package, to assist national 
regulators and ensure that common projects were carried out adequately. While its 
intend correlates with what we have established as necessary its current functioning 
does as mentioned not (A. Lis, 2014, p. 6). ACER acts primarily through 
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recommendations and opinions (Commission, COM (2015) 80, 2015, p. 9).  
ACER’s decision-making rights are very limited in that it can only make decisions at 
the request of the national regulators. This would of course involve a conferral of 
sovereign rights from the Member States to a competent authority to in a higher 
degree than now oversee the development of the internal market and related market 
rules and deal with cross-border issues (Commission, COM (2015) 80, 2015, p. 9-10).  
Entrapment would expect member states to play along with such a norm-consistent 
policy, if it is framed in a correct manner. We have concluded that it is very likely to 
be framed in the correct manner, in order for the Member States to correspond with 
the policy. The establishment of supranational bodies to oversee, what has previously, 
been de facto a national decision is however an area, which from competing theory 
and historical evaluation has been heavily contested. We have previously established 
that Member States has previously been quite reluctant to give up sovereignty in the 
area of energy relations (Commission: COM (2015)(0105) Green European 
Foundation, 2011, p. 6). Especially the area of transition towards improved decision-
making roles for coordinating and regulating bodies, as described above, has been 
challenged greatly by national interests and protectionist measures (S. Andoura &   J. 
Vinois, 2015, p. 46). 
 The creation of a common regulatory framework and an enhancement of the 
competences of institutions such as ACER is evidently a drastic development from 
status quo. This observation forces one to question whether switching over to a single 
integrated European energy coordination policy is really conceivable currently, given 
the differences between the Member States, both in their technical systems and in the 
existing institutional approaches (M. Derdevet, 2015, p. 2). We must then 
acknowledge that the history of energy security and Member State institutional 
cooperation does not support the idealistic vision of Normative Institutionalism. It is 
thus very clear that it is the conditions that must be different from previous ones, in 
order to expect Member States to act any different. Apart from what has already been 
established as appropriate conditions for the Energy Union, one particular change 
over the years might contribute to enhance the already appropriate conditions over the 
past years consolidation and improvement has been ongoing in terms of transmission 
activities, especially in the realm of electricity. New opportunities, in especially the 
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field of natural gas, are thus expected to emerge for the formation of new European 
transmission system operators (M. Derdevet, 2015, p. 2). However even if ACER 
should successfully gain increased decision-making powers, an intergovernmental or 
more realist response would still lay weight on it being merely a forum to pursue 
national interests. We underline the necessity for greater transparency and altered 
institutional approaches in these bodies to ensure that they serve EU commitments, as 
it can be argued, that is not currently a European regulator, but a platform of 
cooperation for the national regulators; “under the close supervision of the Member 
States sitting in its Administrative Board and their National Regulatory Authorities 
sitting in the Board of Regulators” (S. Andoura &   J. Vinois, 2015, p. 52).  
10.5.2. Emergency/reverse flow and solidarity regulations 
As established the Energy Union is a long-term plan that builds on roadmaps and 
strategies set for both 2030 and 2050. It is thereby evident and widely argued that the 
EU will to some degree still be dependent on Russian energy in the foreseeable future 
due to long-term contracts in the Member States (Commission – EU-Russia Energy 
Cooperation 2050, 2013, p. 12; J. Crisp 2014 p. 1; N. Pakhomov, 2014, p. 2). The EU 
will thus still be amenable and vulnerable to Russia energy cut-offs and the political 
leverage associated with the power of energy disruptions (Stratfor: Global 
Intelligence, 2011). It is thereby argued that in order for EU to establish a relationship 
to Russia, in which energy disruption will not wield the same power as previously, it 
necessary to in short-term actions preempt and prevent such situations (S. Andoura &   
J. Vinois, 2015, p. 59).  
Preparation towards energy disruptions is thereby necessary and should build on the 
Regulation on security of gas supply (REG (EU) No 994/2010 (EC) applying the 
definitions and recommendations from the before-mentioned (EC) No 713/2009) The 
Establishment of The Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)(EC) No 
713/2009, art. 2). The points we will underline in this regulation and its foundational 
usage in the secure supplies parts of the Energy Union are: Emergency energy stocks, 
Improved mechanism for emergency planning and finally “de facto solidarity” among 
the Member States. This would from the Energy Union Strategy require both Member 
States, transmission system operators, the energy industry and all other stakeholders 
to work closely together and show great solidarity in times of crisis, as we also stress 
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a revision of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation (Commission, COM (2015) 80, 
2015, p. 9-10). The rhetorical framing of the Member State approach to the Energy 
Union has been with much focus towards maintaining the EU’s normative 
commitment and especially the dimension of establishing a de facto “true solidarity 
and trust” among the states should disruptions occur (Commission, COM(2015)80, 
2015, p. 2). Such establishment should be based on common risk assessments for 
mutual assistance to prevent consequences of disruption and should function through 
effective emergency mechanisms and plans (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 110). 
We will argue that just as the creation of common regulatory frameworks, the 
relevance of emergency mechanisms to the Member States and the legislative 
precedence creates incentive to believe Member States would encourage such a 
common position. We will in particular argue for the relevance of 2009 Ukrainian gas 
supply crisis and of course the 2014 Crimean crisis, which further generated focus on 
the need for increased emergency mechanisms (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 59). 
The establishment of an Energy Union with sufficient emergency plans would thereby 
be established as a structural response to the challenge of “having to secure supply 
under the conditions of globalized and centralized markets” (J. Kopač, 2014, p. 3).  
Concerning precedence, the comprehensive EU Regulation on security of gas supply, 
which is now center to revision in the Energy Union was adopted in response to the 
2009 crisis and established “common EU supply and infrastructure standards for the 
EU member states and a common EU framework requiring preventive action and 
emergency plans in case of supply disruption”. This is strongly recurring throughout 
the Energy Union Strategy, and it can furthermore be argued that the Crimean crisis 
and the energy security risks following shares similarities with the 2009 crisis in that 
both exposed the vulnerability of the energy market to sudden shocks (S. Andoura &   
J. Vinois, 2015, p. 59; J. Kopač, 2014, p. 1). This familiarity on both national and EU-
level with the resources already invested and the imminence of emergency 
preparation with previous failures in mind further our theoretical expectations of 
stronger emergency mechanism to play a central role in the Energy Unions effect on 
Russia. 
 
We will, very importantly, refer back to the previous section and again reinstate the 
need for common emergency position achieved through a clear, coherent and 
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predictable regulatory emergency framework in combination of course in with 
concrete infrastructures/market developments supported by substantial financial 
means. This section focuses on the solidarity dimension of these requirements, which 
lies in the coherent framework (Commission: COM (2015) 80, 2015, p. 2; S. Andoura 
& J. Vinois, 2015, p. 108). 
A key word for the functioning of the Energy Union and furthermore an approach 
valued by Member States from our theory is “coherence”. This element should be the 
most central in the communication measures between the Member States and the EU 
under a crisis, and is also what is center to the greatest change in the EU Regulation 
on security of gas supply when revised in the Energy Union. It will depend on more 
transparency as well as on more solidarity and trust between the Member States 
(Commission: COM (2015) 80, 2015, p. 4). In order to reach a sufficient level of 
transparency in the Energy Union, as outlined in the regulations, we will accentuate 
especially transparent consultation between Member State and the Commission under 
emergencies as an element which, from our framework, is vital for norm-consistency 
and common policy strength. This shall, build on the Energy Union’s building blocks 
of Regulations involve that: Each Member State shall notify to the Commission 
immediately of the Competent Authority or the national entities responsible for 
security of gas supply under energy emergency; Consultation of all actions should 
happen through a three-level approach - first the relevant natural gas undertakings and 
industry, then Member States at national or regional level, and then the Union 
(Commission, 2015). The commission shall approve the emergency plans as being in 
accordance with its commitments, and where it is not it shall be center for revision 
(REG (EU) No 994/2010, art. 3(3)). All communication shall be made public and be 
in accordance with the principles of solidarity as presented in the legal framework.  
The publicity and transparency on energy decisions increases the likelihood that any 
non- compliance with existing EU norms or policy commitments will be noticed and 
subject to disapproval (D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 346). This compliance pull associated 
with publicity and transparency would in a contribute to the compliance with in 
particular the area of de facto solidarity among the Member States, as any actions 
undertaken in conflict with the legislative framework on Cooperation under energy 
disruption would most likely be noticed by the compliant States.  
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If the Member States and, in particular, the Competent Authorities do, as we expect, 
act coherently in regards to the Energy Union Policy it would mean that no measures 
are introduced which “unduly restrict the flow of gas within the internal market at any 
time”; no measures are introduced that are likely to endanger the gas supply situation 
in another Member State; and no measures are introduced which hinder the pooling of 
energy resources where infrastructure allows it  (REG (EU) No 994/2010, art. 10(7)(a 
+ b)). If said transparency, communication and solidarity are to prosper under the 
Energy Union, any such enhanced cooperation under energy and especially gas 
disruption would greatly lower the impact Russia could potentially have through its 
energy leverage on the EU (A. Lis, 2014, p. 4-9). Mutual assistance to prevent and 
mitigate the consequences of disruption through procedural consistency and 
emergency plans are however short-term and despite lowering consequences of 
energy disruption does not directly lower EU’s dependence on Russia. Counter-acts 
are however of great importance as it leads to a discourse of offense and distance 
towards Russian display of Energy power (M. Šefčovič, 2014; European Council 
Conclusions, 23/24 October 2014, p. 108). A common regional Emergency strategy 
would undoubtedly be beneficial for all Member States affected by a disruption. 
However it will most likely be most beneficial for Member States sharing similar 
supply and emergency patterns (D. Leifheit, 2014, p. 1). Even if similar emergency 
patterns are implemented, the very dissimilar supply patterns on the other might 
present another challenge towards the emergency system’s successfulness in practice. 
As evident from Figure 1, which shows the effect of the 2009 gas crisis, countries are 
not all affected in the same degree. Some countries will thus in a much higher degree 
benefit from emergency assistance than others (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 60).  
 
Skeptics could thus argue that complete and coherent solidarity will be hard to 
achieve, as the stakes are not equally distributed among the EU.  Especially the 
markets in Central and South-eastern Europe are tied to long-term supplies, which 
creates considerable obstacles for the Western and Northern Member States as they 
are much less affected supply-wise and could thus be expected to be more reluctant to 
follow the directives appropriately in emergency actions not directly benefitting them. 
This does according A. Janczak, Deputy Director of the EU Economic Department 
however not hold true, as an integrated single energy market would connect markets 
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and a higher degree and thereby also enhance the incentive for solidarity mechanism 
and cooperation towards preventing future energy disruptions (D. Leifheit, 2014, p. 
1). Homogeneity in national energy is however not an ambition of the Energy Union 
and difference in preferences will continue to exist. In that regard not all measures 
will be suitable for all Member States. The effectiveness of emergency measures are 
thereby grounded deeply in solidarity and complete enforcement of existing 
legislature in the field (Council, 2014).   
10.5.3. Secure supplies: 
 
A major point of importance addressed in the Energy Union is the issue of securing 
energy supplies. Several examples within recent time have reinforced the notion that 
secure supplies are of importance in relation to EU energy security. The gas supply 
disruption of January 2009 referred to as the Ukrainian gas crisis fostered a 
comprehensive EU Regulation on security of gas supply. It established and outlined 
specific common EU supply and infrastructure standards for the Member States and a 
common EU framework requiring preventive action and emergency plans in case of 
supply disruption (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 59). The importance of reverse 
flows in the gas infrastructures and of connecting storages and LNG terminals to the 
network was recognized to improve security of supply. Such EU regulation has 
proven its usefulness as it has provided the sufficient EU framework and common 
rules that market operators should adopt (C. Egenhofer, et. al., 2014, p. 4). 
In order for the Energy Union to induce the greatest potential, in relation to shape the 
EU-Russia energy interdependency the EU should focus on the need for redundant 
gas infrastructure in order to increase security of supply.  A system that relies on a 
single fuel, a single transmission line or a single telecommunication system is 
inherently more vulnerable than one that relies on a diversity of, and redundancy 
among resources or lines (C. Egenhofer, et. al., 2014, p. 4).  
 
The implementation of the EU internal market rules has not entirely been able to 
fulfill its expectations of converging national policies and foster coherence between 
different national decisions in the energy field. There is evidence that national energy 
independence and unilateralism with some degree of protectionism has spread and 
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evolved in most of Europe in recent years (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 69).  
Sovereignty has been on the rise in relation to safeguarding individual policies. 
Member States have taken unilateral measures without discussing possible 
consequences of such decisions with neighbors. The lack of intercommunication has 
limited neighbor’s opportunity for involvement or assistance and thus created a 
certain national distinction among them (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 70). These 
unilateral national interventions in the energy markets not coordinated at the EU 
institutional level counteract our normatively derived concept of forum. Our theory 
proposes that the forums in which policies/decisions transpire are vital to the outcome 
of certain policy-making. The entrapment hypothesis thus faces some resistance 
according to this tendency of independent decision-making by the Member States. 
The unilateral decision-making in such cases can have serious effects on cross-border 
exchanges, impeding competition and threatening the very foundation of the internal 
market and its level of integration, while also reflecting a lack of confidence in the 
European process as outlined by its core institutions (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 
70). Experiences of this sort, has nonetheless arguably led to a greater awareness of 
the need for enhanced coordination. In order to improve cross-border cooperation 
there is a clear need for a central regulative body like ACER since there has been a 
lack of sufficient tools in this regard previously. The Energy Union strategy proposed 
by the Commission addresses this issue and vice president of the Commission Maroš 
Sefčovič stated in a recent speech that there is an imminent need to reinforce 
interconnections of national energy networks and cooperation. He further argued that 
a resilient internal energy market would help the EU combat the illegitimate use of 
energy as a political tool (Maroš Šefčovič, 2015).   
 
The Energy Union has as previously argued been subject to a great deal of public 
attention inter alia due to recent events in Ukraine and the increased focus on energy 
security. The EU has through rhetorical framing and investment of time and resources 
managed to establish a wide support of the efforts and visions embedded in the 
Energy Union. For the first time since the 2007-2009 climate and energy package 
agreement there is a consensus on energy and climate change (C. Egenhofer, et. al., 
2014, p. 1).  
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Our hypothesis of entrapment is thus supported through the normatively derived 
conditions of publicity, precedent, relevance which are all evident in current 
rhetoric/action and could as such be regarded as a possible game changer in relation to 
stir away from the tendency of unilateral decision-making. There is according to this 
line of thought, reason to believe that Member States will have the right incentive to 
align preferences and cooperate thus ultimately reducing dependence on Russian 
energy (A. Gusev, 2007, p. 110).  
    
The intensified attention on energy security is also evident Commission’s Energy 
Security Strategy. In May 2014 it was explicitly acknowledged that the EU remains 
vulnerable to external energy shocks in terms of disruption in deliverance. The 
Energy Union elaborates on this notion and addresses the issue through several 
measures including diversifying energy imports, suppliers and routes of supply, while 
increasing the EU’s weight in global energy markets (Maroš Šefčovič, 2015). There is 
from the Commission a special focus on the Southern Gas Corridor and liquid hubs in 
the Mediterranean and Central Eastern Europe (Maroš Šefčovič, 2015). Furthermore 
there is a need to build an internal energy market where energy can flow freely across 
national borders, which entails investment in infrastructure at regional levels and 
harmonized legislation at the EU level. 
 
In the EU Commission’s framework strategy it is evident that cooperation is vital for 
securing supplies. Member States, transmission system operators, the energy industry 
and all other involved parties have to work closely together in order to ensure a 
sufficient level of energy security for Europeans and their companies (Commission, 
2015, COM(2015) 80 p. 5). An important step concerning oil has already been taken 
with the implementation of the 2009 Oil Stocks Directive, which obligates Member 
States to build up and maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and petroleum products 
(Council Directive 2009/119/EC). This directive was implemented in order to assure 
Member States that they can rely on their neighbors in situations of supply 
disruptions. Solidarity among Member States in such situations is envisioned to be 
strengthened through the Energy Union.   
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The focus on the potential of liquefied natural gas (LNG) especially as an alternative 
or supplement to the existing gas pipeline system has increased. The vision is that in 
times of supply crisis LNG could act as a sufficient substitute. Skeptics of LNG as a 
supplement to or even sufficient alternative to the gas pipeline system, has 
consistently pointed out that, LNG prices is too high compared to already existing 
pipeline routes. Proponents of theoretical approaches like Intergovernmentalism and 
Rational Choice would argue that the current efforts of implementing and strengthen 
LNG trade and the benefits deriving therefrom are outweighed by the associated costs 
(Commission, 2015, COM(2015) 80, p. 5). The European Commission will in order to 
address such issues prepare a comprehensive LNG strategy accounting for necessary 
infrastructure, linking LNG access points with the internal market, conduct work to 
remove obstacles to LNG imports from the US and other LNG producers among other 
things (Commission, 2015, COM(2015) 80, p. 5). The Commission has as such 
invested its resources in framing alternatives to current supply, which according to the 
precedence condition of entrapment enhance the likelihood of cooperation and 
agreement on this issue. This initiative also raises focus on the issue of secure supply 
in terms of working towards intensified diversification of imports in order to become 
less dependent on Russian energy. The explicit emphases on the relevance of secure 
supplies by the EU institutionally, and the public attention it has achieved does 
accordingly provide a solid foundation for agreement and cooperation on alternative 
supplies like the LNG.   
 
Security of supply is vital to all the Member States of the EU, but as previously 
outlined the dependencies of foreign supply varies greatly within the EU.  Member 
States in Central and Eastern Europe are generally more prone to supply disruptions 
from Russia. Imports of Russian gas in many of these States ranges from 60% to 
100% and thus there exists a general wish that the Commission would establish a 
mechanism for common purchasing of gas from outside the EU in order to become 
less dependent on one supplier (D. Keating, 2015, p. 4). As we mentioned in our 
historic section, a country like Poland who were previously part of the USSR is an 
example of a country that is especially keen to pull away from Russia and minimalize 
current ties as well as move on from historical ones. Other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe like the Baltic States and Finland would also achieve vast benefits 
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through common purchasing. These countries do on average pay 10-13% more than 
countries located in Western Europe (F. Genoese et. al., 2014, p. 1-2). Enhancing 
bargaining power through centralized purchasing is seen as a successful way of 
reducing procurement costs. If these countries engaged in a centralized gas purchasing 
mechanism that might be a regional solution to address the issue of higher import 
prices (F. Genoese et. al., 2014, p. 2). Most western Member States are more hesitant 
in this connection arguably because the issue is not as pressing, but explicitly because 
they are concerned such a mechanism would violate single-market and competition 
rules (D. Keating, 2015).   
Even though many stakeholders are critical of a common purchasing mechanism there 
are still many proponents of the idea, and solid arguments connected to them. Possible 
benefits is believed to be a help in ‘lifting’ infrastructure for new import pipelines 
from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Israel and Cyprus and Northern Iraq (C. 
Egenhofer et. al., 2014, p. 4). A common purchasing mechanism could offer security 
of demand for many importers, which is something they have been asking 
consistently.  
10.5.4. Increased funding on infrastructure: 
Diversification of energy imports, have proven to be of major concern to the 
European Union, especially in light of recent events in Ukraine. The notion, that an 
increased variety of suppliers and alternative routes are crucial for ensuring secure 
supplies to Europeans, is a vital part of the Energy Union strategy as expressed by the 
Commission.  
According to Normative Institutionalism and the hypothesis of entrapment, the 
condition of forum is of major relevance in this connection. In order for the EU to 
accomplish the strategy of diversifying imports there is an imminent need for 
constructing new infrastructure required to deliver new gas to the EU, which is both a 
complex and expensive affair (COM(2015)80, 2015, p.4).  Decisions in this 
connection require resolute action at EU level, and do as such correspond with 
entrapment’s assumption that when policies transpire within a EU institutional forum, 
the likelihood of agreement in foreign policy negotiations rises. The Commission is 
heavily invested in this process and committed to the use of all available funding 
instruments, for the strategy to succeed. A particular funding instrument in this case is 
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the future European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). A requirement for these 
financial funds to function is accordingly a necessary focus on infrastructure 
internally and externally (COM(2015)80, 2015, p.5). Energy infrastructure projects 
have historically faced problems of acceptance by neighboring populations, which 
delay deployment and increase costs. Even though the infrastructure might provide 
benefits to an entire country or Europe generally, their inconveniences are often 
concentrated in specific areas. The implementation of an EFSI would reduce these 
additional costs, through funding of territories crossed by this strategic infrastructure. 
It would also accelerate the required time to complete projects and boost the activity 
of the areas affected through investments (M. Derdevet, 2015, p. 4).  
Diversifying imports has recently been on the agenda publicly, and the EU rhetoric 
concerning events in Ukraine and its connectedness to energy security is broadly 
acknowledged (EU Commission, 2015). The current ability of Russia and its company 
Gazprom to exert political leverage through its energy supply to the EU 
corresponding to 53% of EU gas imports is an issue of magnitude worth considering. 
There is according to the condition of publicity and precedence thus reason to believe 
that an ambitious policy like the Energy Union is supported, due to significant public 
attention encouraging Member State’s incentive to cooperate together with previous 
funding and incentives to fund such projects (D.C Thomas, 2009, p. 504).  
 
Furthermore, the channeling of EU funds available to specific objectives contributes 
to the achievement of the internal market and the goals set by the European Council, 
avoiding short-term politically driven infrastructures. Identifying the right projects 
and analyzing their costs and benefits as well as establishing the actual cross- border 
allocation of costs are essential to secure public acceptance and a fast implementation 
(S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 9). The adoption of the 2013 Infrastructure Package 
has allocated a stronger emphasis on the need to increase physical integration of the 
internal energy market through infrastructure like transmission lines, interconnections, 
LNG terminals and storage facilities (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 53). The 
process to finance this sort of infrastructure has been assigned with a great deal of 
interest. The definition of projects of common interest (PCI) as a collective process 
including several parties e.g. Member States and regulative bodies like ACER 
regionally has developed significantly. The benefits of regulators like ACER has been 
	   52	  
substantive in terms of permit granting, cost allocation and financing which are all a 
contributing factor in relation to the creation of a well-integrated network (S. Andoura 
& J. Vinois, 2015, p. 54). As we have however also highlighted, the legislative and 
decision-making powers of regulatory bodies like ACER does still have a long way to 
come to enable the EU to act collectively on funding an common project. The 
establishments of funding instruments like the EFSI and regulative bodies like ACER 
are arguably of great importance in order to provide the right incentive for Member 
States to make commitments towards the Energy Union.  
It is still argued though that regulative instruments like ACER while being responsible 
for taking individual decisions on specific cross-border issues and being able to adopt 
non-binding guidelines it is still not empowered to adopt binding rules. Skeptics 
would argue that it is thus not a European regulator but merely a platform of 
cooperation for the national regulative bodies under close supervision of National 
Regulatory Authorities (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 52).  
Furthermore the transmission infrastructure would need to be managed by a body 
acting at the EU level in order to better combine the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different national energy resources and systems, through a reinforced European use of 
the transmission system (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 52). 
 
As previously mentioned in the historical section the EU Energy Strategy of 2007 
were an important step in EU energy politics and resembled a major progress in 
relation to acting as a united entity on the field of energy.  
Several Member States with close ties to Russia like Germany, Austria and Italy and 
their individual companies acted in unity in 2006 when extremely cold weather 
prevented Gazprom from providing the required additional volumes of gas face major 
issues that led to considerations in terms of security of supply. Such experiences of 
disruption in deliverance do without a doubt shape future intergovernmental relations. 
The relevance of the need for improved and additional funding, and even the option of 
a pooling resources is thereby increasing as new disruptions emerge, and could 
arguably finally have hit a point where the imminence of infrastructure has become 
clear for most Member States (A. Gusev, 2007, p. 109).  
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The conditions of relevance and precedence found in the entrapment hypothesis are 
thus vital in this connection. The EU has institutionally already invested resources and 
dedicated large amounts of time, in order to outline the sufficient conditions for the 
Energy Union to emerge. The relevance is according to examples like the disruption 
in gas deliverance of 2006 and the Crimean crisis of 2014 rising, and there is 
according to entrapment normative evidence that previous close European allies of 
Russia like Germany and Italy is shifting its rhetoric and preferences in the direction 
of the EU and their efforts invested as a precedent condition of entrapment (A. Gusev, 
2007, p. 109).  
In addition to creating and funding the necessary infrastructure required of an internal 
energy market, the European Council also addresses the need to develop a more 
effective and flexible market design that would enhance regional cooperation, better 
integrate renewables while ensuring that public intervention compatible with the 
internal market is respected (EU Council, 2015). The objectives internally is plural 
but there is nonetheless extensive normatively based conditions present that increases 
the likelihood of inducing normative commitments from the individual Member States 
according to the hypothesis of entrapment.  
Our argument is thus that countries like Germany with historically close ties to 
Russia, will gradually acknowledge the intensified focus, by the Juncker Commison 
on energy politics, as evident in the Energy Union will demand normative 
considerations. As our theory suggests Member States whose preferences are seen as 
inconsistent with the EU’s norms will be less willing to insist on their preferences and 
more likely to make compromises, and as such more likely to make compromises and 
follow the norm-consistent policy outlined at the EU-level.  
 
Skeptics of the Energy Union emphasize various issues within this specific area of 
attention.  
In relation to infrastructure as a crucial element of the Energy Union there is an 
imminent need to foster trust and solidarity within the EU. It is vital that the EU is 
capable of operationalizing funding instruments like EFSI in order to create the right 
incentive for Member States to shift preferences and cooperate. By increasing the 
already existing commitments from the EU in this area a certain rise might also be 
expected by Member States (D.C. Thomas, 2009, 346). To be successful the EU will 
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most likely need to abstain from its recurrent tendency to focus on too many projects 
in order to please every single Member State. The European Energy Security Strategy 
has laid a solid foundation in this regard reducing the number of projects to 10 short-
term and 17 long-term projects (C. Egenhofer, et. al., 2014, p. 3-4). Despite the 
relative success of the European Energy Security Strategy it should arguably still be 
prioritized to honor the EU’s commitment to address the fragility of energy islands as 
well as to increase reverse flow capacity. Energy islands within the EU are still 
plenty, including key areas such as the Iberian Peninsula, the Baltic States, UK and 
Ireland. The current lack of interconnection equals significant price differences and a 
waste of resources since it does not allow EU markets with overcapacity to match 
those with scarcer resources (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 55). There are major 
current infrastructural objectives in relation to enhance the connections of East with 
the West and North with the South, which should be devoted special attention. The 
Trans-European networks (TEN-E) provisions do currently not allow the EU to 
mandate direct action, but merely to facilitate national initiatives and as such are not 
capable of ensuring cross-border infrastructures (S. Andoura & J. Vinois, 2015, p. 
57). Infrastructures are, all things being equal still largely depending on the 
willingness of each EU Member State to build them. This could be crucial in relation 
to provide the right incentive for Member States to in some cases reverse the flows on 
gas pipelines to be implemented in one country for the benefit of another country, 
which raises a focus on the need for improved solidarity. We will argue that a 
comprehensive EU regulatory framework for security of such a system would 
strengthen Member State incentives and foster solidarity.  It should by now also be 
clear that the areas, which we have highlighted, are very interdependent and the 
establishment of powerful transnational regulatory frameworks is a necessity for both 
infrastructure, emergency mechanism and as will be presented also alternative supply 
route policies. 
 
The following sections will shortly sum up the findings from each of the sections in 
order to present an overview of the areas, which will be used in following sections. 
 
Common regulatory frameworks: 
The transition towards improved decision-making roles for coordinating and 
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regulating bodies in a common regulatory framework could, through solidarity and 
cooperation foster a very effective foreign energy policy towards Russia, as the EU 
would be able to act collectively on strategic decisions. Similarly, from this 
expectation the surrendering of sovereignty is also what we would expect to result as 
the highest level of disagreements, especially between the Eastern and Western 
countries, which general have very different approaches to such a solution.    
 
Emergency mechanisms: 
Emergency is the one of our point to which we believe there exists the least amount of 
foundation for nonconformity with EU commitments. Even as we argue, that energy 
disruptions do not directly impact all Member States equally or even impact at all, an 
enhanced emergency would not require any conferral of power. It would however 
require Member States to fully implement existing legislature in the field fully, which 
might present challenges as the stakes or supply patterns differ greatly and any 
collective prevention and mitigation of disruptions would rely considerably on the 
principle of assumed/de facto solidarity. It would furthermore enhance the defensive 
position of the EU towards Russia.  
  
Funding of infrastructure:    
With an explicit goal of lessening dependence on foreign suppliers, diversify imports, 
enhance conditions of an internal market etc. there is an imminent need for 
investments in infrastructure. The Commission has included some solutions in 
relation to the funding of the required infrastructure, and proposed that regulative and 
funding bodies like ACER and EFSI should have a central role in carrying it out. 
There are nonetheless still major objectives of securing supplies. EU does currently 
not have the mandate to ensure cross-border infrastructures and can merely facilitate 
national decision-making. The commitments towards funding infrastructure are 
diverse and some countries are hesitant in relation to cooperation. If the Energy Union 
through normative commitments from the Member States are to lessen dependence on 
Russia comprehensive investments are required.     
  
Secure Supplies:  
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EU has proven to be vulnerable in relation to external energy shocks. The import of 
53% of its total energy consumption from Russia reinforces this notion. With recent 
events in Ukraine and previous unilateral decisions like Germany agreeing to the 
Nord Stream pipeline in 2005 bypassing countries like Poland there has been a greater 
emphasis on the need for enhanced coordination and cooperation. Maros Sefcovic 
addressed this issue in a recent speech arguing for the imminent need to reinforce 
interconnections of national energy networks in order to secure supplies. Various 
regulations with the goal of ensuring security of supply is under construction, while 
some have been implemented already. For this vital element of the Energy Union to 
entail change and normative commitment by the Member States, dedication is 
required both at the national level and at the EU level. 
 
Through the analysis we narrowed in on four key areas which we argue could have a 
significant effect on the EU-Russia energy relations through normative commitments 
in the Member States – Common regulatory frameworks, emergency/solidarity 
mechanisms, increased infrastructure funding and finally the aspect of secure 
supplies. Normative Institutionalism has proven a useful tool to understand and 
explain why Member States would engage cooperatively in committing itself to the 
commitments of the Energy Union. Alternative explanations and foresights must 
though be accounted for, as we do acknowledge that it is merely a framework for 
understanding policy negotiations and outcomes, which undoubtedly has many other 
facets than just norm commitment. 
 
11. Discussion 
 
Our theoretically grounded analysis of some of the main constituents of the Energy 
Union has led us to 4 concrete conclusions, which enables us to argue on both the 
likelihood of the European Union’s successfulness and the impact it might have on 
the EU-Russia energy interdependence.  
 
The Energy Union is unique in the sense that it in this initial phase has faced broad 
support by Member States, other stakeholders and institutionally within the EU. It is 
rare that there is consensus on energy policy within the EU and this proposal should 
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be viewed in an elaborative context of a previous successful legislative strategy, the 
European Energy Strategy of 2007. The Energy Union is arguably even more 
ambitious, and the timing might be more appropriate in relation to demanding resolute 
action at national and EU-level, which we will elaborate on in this section.  
First, we will however discuss why our findings in the analysis section are of 
relevance in relation to assessing the Energy Union’s impact on our dependent 
variable of the EU-Russia energy interdependency.  
 
In our section of the ‘Common Regulative Framework’ we argue that there is 
currently a transition towards improved decision-making roles for coordinating and 
regulating bodies like ACER. These bodies/instruments would through a common 
regulatory framework enable the EU to act collectively on strategic decisions, which 
have historically been an issue of magnitude. If Member States are willing to 
centralize decision-making on energy through transferring competences to an 
instrument working at the EU-level as a sign of solidarity and trust, the EU would 
increase its bargaining power towards major suppliers like Russia. This notion 
correlates with the concept of common purchasing presented in the section of ‘Secure 
Supplies’. The viability of common purchasing is as previously mentioned 
particularly present in the Central or Eastern Member States, but build on the valid 
argument that unity in purchasing power increases transparency and bargaining power 
towards suppliers like Russia who charge many of these States excessively for supply 
of gas. Even though many Western Member States are generally opposed to this idea, 
we found through analyzing the secure supplies dimension of the Energy Union, that 
normative commitments by these States gradually enforced by previous and recent 
events in Ukraine could very well be subject to change. The publicity and relevance 
associated with events in Ukraine and accordingly with the acknowledgment that 
enhanced energy security is of great importance and common interest provides the 
necessary foundations for a shift towards EU norms and interests. This possible shift 
is though still conditional by the fact that Member State would have to surrender 
competences and ultimately sovereignty in this policy area, which historically have 
been a difficult barricade to overcome in several policy areas. This case is particularly 
difficult since preferences are quite diverse between Eastern and Western States. 
Another institutional objective is the issue of funding the appropriate infrastructure 
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required which we addressed in the analytical section. The Commission suggest 
solutions to this issue like the implementation of future funding instruments like 
EFSI, but does evidently still lack the necessary commitments. It is clear that Member 
States will have to commit themselves not only normatively but also economically in 
order to establish sufficient amounts of resources, to undergo the radical development 
in cross-border infrastructure required to achieve the Energy Union goals of 
diversifying imports, securing supplies, establish an internal market etc. entails.  
 
A recurrent issue in this relation is the fact that the EU does not have the mandate to 
ensure cross-border infrastructures and can currently merely act as a facilitator of 
national decision-making. Thus the EU shall not only convince Member States to 
undergo normative radical changes as outlined in the Energy Union Strategy on key 
areas like the ones emphasized in the analytical section, but also promote economical 
support and encourage the transfer of national sovereignty to some extent. Skeptics of 
such attempts like Intergovernmentalist would argue that this is a too ambitious 
proposal and is too comprehensive to succeed. As we have outlined previously in this 
section, Member States might pursue specific areas of the proposal and be hesitant in 
adhering to others. Dedication by Member States and internal institutions in terms of 
normative commitment is nonetheless a vital requirement for success of the Energy 
Union and hereby decisive in relation to its effect on the EU-Russia energy 
relationship.  
 
Another point of relevance of the Energy Union is the notion of ‘emergency 
mechanisms’ as described in the analysis section. Our findings suggest that the 
establishment of emergency mechanisms would further enhance the defensive united 
position that might emerge as a result of the Energy Union and provide support for a 
common gradual shift away from Russian affiliations. As we have previously argued, 
energy disruptions do not present the same challenges to every individual Member 
State for a variety of reasons, and as such it is arguable that the States with the least to 
loose in cases of disruptions might not engage in such arrangements. We do however 
expect this part of the Energy Union to face the least amount of non-compliance since 
it does not entail any conferral of power or sovereignty, but merely cooperation 
according to a solidarity principle that matches the normative investments and 
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characteristics of the EU. A more Realist/Intergovernmentalist perception of this line 
of reasoning might argue that States only engage in cooperation for its own benefit, 
and since some Member States are not as dependent on foreign supplies as others they 
would not be encouraged to support this sort of mechanisms. Furthermore such a 
system would require Member States to fully implement existing legislature in field 
fully, even though supply patterns differ, and thus a potential mitigation of possible 
disruptions would rely heavily on the principle of de facto solidarity.  
 
Normatively speaking it is nonetheless a very feasible scenario that Member States 
would cooperate according to this principle of solidarity. Especially considering that 
our findings suggest that the timing of the proposal in the context of recent events in 
Ukraine and Russia’s political international behavior strengthens internal cooperation 
and solidarity. Furthermore, implementing emergency mechanisms deviate from the 
other areas of focus since it does not entail a conferral of power and as such a loss of 
sovereignty.           
 
Generally speaking our findings suggest that the Energy Union would give the EU 
much more power and choice in relation to the trade and consumption of energy 
products alongside the Commission’s goal of making the energy industry more 
‘renewable and sustainable’ (N. Pahwa, 2015). It is though a very ambitious strategy 
that might face objectives on different levels e.g. by Member States especially in 
terms of transferring competences to a centralized body in terms of various 
instruments like ACER, ESFI etc. as proposed by the Commission. It is apart from 
such concerns a proposal with a lot of potential that exhibits progress in relation to the 
EU’s normative commitments/ambitions of preserving the status as a world leader in 
the field of (renewable) energy. Furthermore it is not only a move to put energy at the 
core of the agenda but also a proposal that acknowledges the importance of such 
policies for the EU’s economy, well-being of European citizens and security e.g. in 
terms of eradicating or lowering dependence on major energy suppliers like Russia 
and as such removing their ability to use this dependency as political leverage (C. 
Egenhofer et. al., 2014, p. 4).  
 
In order to establish the most nuanced discussion of our findings, we propose in the 
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following section the limitations of our main theory Normative Institutionalism and 
acknowledge that alternative theories might provide a similar or completely different 
rhetorical framework for interpretation of our findings.   
 
11.1. Theoretical validity discussion: 
 
We have very explicitly and consciously relied on the independent variable of 
normative commitment as a direct mechanism for fostering cooperation. Conclusions 
has thus to a certain degree treated all Member States as corresponding in 
homogeneity and acting according to the same motives, which simply cannot hold 
true with 28 inherently different actors of nature. This is a bold assumption as it is 
assumed that when Member State cooperate and norm consistency is evident and a 
certain set of conditions similarly exist the reason for said cooperation and norm 
consistency must necessarily correlate with an adoption of EU norms in the Member 
States. Furthermore the theory does, especially when entrapment is assumed, not 
account much for alternative explanations. Furthermore it does not merely frame the 
adoption and entrapment to norms as solely part of the explanation, but suggests that 
it forms the basis for when a norm consistent policy is created. In a case study 
conducted by D. C. Thomas and F. Schimmelfennig of 14 different policy negotiation 
outcomes more than half of them were supported by the Intergovernmentalist 
hypotheses where the conditions for entrapment of cooperative bargaining did not 
exist (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 493). This means two things: 
First, it does on one hand support the hypotheses of entrapment and cooperative 
bargaining in that when the conditions for these were not present they were similarly 
not emerging as the nature of that policy negotiation (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. 
Thomas, 2009, p. 494). Secondly, on the other hand, as many of the case studies did 
not show characteristics of entrapment nor cooperative bargaining it could be risky to 
assume that the normative behavior can change that drastically from case to case with 
only the existence of certain conditions as the independent variable. We propose 
thereby, in the light of Intergovernmentalist considerations of state behavior that 
correlation, but not necessarily causation, exists between the presence of certain 
conditions and normative cooperation. In cases like ours where the conditions did 
indeed exist, Normative Institutionalism did correspondingly provide an excellent 
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framework for understanding the following expectations and existence of Member 
State engagement. The internal validity of the theory has proven strong in explaining 
the entrapment process in relation to the Energy Union, but as its external validity in 
other cases has proven low, as evident from the above mentioned case study, it forces 
us consider at least two aspects of our conclusions: 
1) Is it reasonable to assume norm adoption and entrapment as the foundation for 
cooperation equally among all Member States or is this view too simplistic? 
2) Which other theoretical explanations might equally account for the 
development/implementation and future of the Energy Union? 
 
It might be reasonable to treat the 28 EU Member States as a unity when it comes to 
the question of the need for an Energy Union. All national Energy Ministers did in 
February declare strong support for the establishment of an Energy Union (Video: 
The Energy Union Conference of the EU Energy Ministers). However disagreement is 
to be found in exactly what should constitute the Energy Union, and thereby 
consequently what ultimate effect it will have on the dependence of Russian Energy 
(D. Keating, 2015, p. 2).  
 
As it also has been pointed out in the analysis, Normative Institutionalism and the part 
of entrapment in particular, is a very idealistic approach to foreign policy 
negotiations. One could from a more Intergovernmentalist approach still argue that 
states would all embrace the idea of an Energy Union if it were mutually benefitting 
in one way or the other, the exact legislative changes to come might not receive the 
same wide-spread support. This assumption is rooted in the rearrangement from 
national decision-making to the governing by regional or supranational bodies more 
or less central to all of the four areas we have proposed. At the very least, a normative 
discourse in the actual implementation of the regulations and pieces of law associated 
with the Energy Union might help to shift preferences more towards the common 
good, on behalf of self-interest to a greater extent. It might turn out that Normative 
Institutionalism can account sufficiently for the discourse leading to the broadly 
adopted notion and acceptance that some degree of an Energy Union is of imminent 
need. Whereas more contested theory like Intergovernmentalism might be better to 
account for the actual negotiation process, and potential opposition to come. The 
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central question is then if what we have accounted for with Normative 
Institutionalism could just as well have been explained with an Intergovernmentalist 
approach. In this connection we argue, that through the use of Normative 
Institutionalism we have established, that as a point of departure states have its own 
inherent set of preferences, which might be center to change through EU norm 
commitments. However one could from an Intergovernmentalist point of view argue 
that the agreement and support of the idea of an Energy Union might be rooted in very 
individual and different aspects of the Energy Union to which Member States are 
committed. Member States might have shown support of the Energy Union on the 
basis of one or more particular commitments to which they expect to benefit and not 
necessarily on the basis of EU policy coherence and solidarity.  
 
This alternative explanation is what is accounted for in Normative Institutionalism as 
“Normative Underdetermination”. This can be said to exist, and is most often the 
case, when a policy-negotiation involve more than one norm or policy-precedent with 
implication for the policy negotiation under hand (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. 
Thomas, 2009, p. 501). Although the energy union consists of 5 “interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing” dimensions they still have their own associated regulations and 
policy norms attributed, which again also varies from Member State to Member State. 
For example the dimensions of emission reduction and secure supplies do of course 
have overarching action plans but one set of actors might push tremendously for 
emission reduction as this is already in line with their pre-determined policy 
commitments, and while having little or no reason to engage actively in pursuing new 
supply routes, as this has no direct effect or connection to its preferences. It might 
have indirect effect in that it could strengthen the role of the EU internationally, but it 
would be the area of emission reduction, which would create the highest incentive to 
engage. Explained in the framework of Normative Institutionalism, Member States 
that prefer policy X might find themselves entrapped by the norm dictating Policy Y, 
while Member States that prefer policy Y might simultaneously find themselves 
entrapped by policy X (F. Schimmelfennig & D. C. Thomas, 2009, p. 501). This 
could dictate contradictory policies, although both Member States has a rational 
incentive to engage and cooperate – but on a self-interested foundation. While this 
process does indeed still support the concept and hypotheses of entrapment, it 
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weakens the explanation of commitment to EU norms as an explanatory factor/ the 
independent variable. One should though, when utilizing the procedural elements of 
entrapment, which can still be viable, be careful with concluding the reasons to 
engage as normative of nature, where they might be of a more rational nature and 
support opposing theories as Intergovernmentalism or Rational Choice 
Institutionalism.  
 
This consideration can be illustrated with an argument emerging under the dimension 
of secure supplies – the option of common purchasing of gas. It is argued in various 
think tanks that this debate will have a great impact on the actual effect of the Energy 
Unions ability to make the Member States act collectively in ensuring secure supplies 
and might very well turn toxic (C. Egenhofer et. al., 2014, p. 4; A. Lis, 2014, p. 10-
12; D. Keating, 2015, p. 4-6; F. Genoese et. al., 2014, p. 2).  Especially Poland, who 
has long been pushing for the dimension of secure supplies, proposed to establish a 
European institution to purchase gas for all 28 EU Member States. This would in 
practice overarch with our considerations of establishing common regulatory 
frameworks or even a supranational operational center (A. Lis, 2014, p. 11). Council 
President Donald Tusk did, in the same line of argument, in collaboration with Poland 
propose a mechanism for collective gas purchasing to enhance the EU’s energy 
resilience (C. Egenhofer et. al., 2014, p. 4). Germany on the other hand has strongly 
declared their discontent with such approach as a proposal of a common purchasing 
run counter to the liberalization of gas markets in Europe. Germany argues instead 
that a strengthening and completion of the internal market is the most effective way to 
strengthen the negotiation position of Companies (D. Keating, 2015, p. 4). Poland 
insist as a counter to this, that setting up an EU agency consisting of all the interested 
companies to aggregate the energy demands could effectively remedy the 
segmentation of national markets demands (D. Keating, 2015, p. 4). Rhetorically 
Germany has bypassed the issue of granting energy regulatory powers to the EU 
institutions and generally setting the area of common foreign energy policy aside for a 
later stage. Rooted in the strong position of Germany as a trade and economic partner 
for Russia diversification of energy supplies has been downplayed in favor of areas to 
which it is more committed and where losses would not be as big (R. Zajdler, 2012, p. 
139; A. Lis, 2014, p. 10). It has instead shifted intensified focus towards opposing 
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emission-heavy energy production and sources, and pushed for a more ambitious 
range of climate goals by 2030 (D. Keating, 2015, p. 4). 
When considering secure supplies and common purchasing from outside the EU, 
Denmark has very ambitious climate goals similar to Germany and seeks the most 
climate-neutral solutions, but utilizing what is already available most optimally. UK 
and France are more flexible in how such a goal should be achieved. UK is pushing 
for exploration of shale gas, while is strictly opposed in France where the practice is 
banned. France, and to some degree also the UK pushes instead for nuclear power 
sources all the while Germany is firmly opposed to nuclear power (D. Keating, 2015, 
p. 3-5). What these countries do however have in common is a shared perception of 
climate policies as a driving force in the Energy Union. This stands in contrast to 
Eastern Europe where security of supply and infrastructure funding are heavily 
overrepresented in its rhetoric towards the project. UK pointed to the Baltics and 
Poland as countries, which slows down the ambitious climate action in Europe by 
building its energy security on coal supplies and neglecting certain parts of the Energy 
Union (A. Lis, 2014, p. 8-11). The Polish initiative of focusing on infrastructure was 
however encouraged by especially Spain hoping that building a gas interconnector 
between Spain and France would enable it to sell its cheap Algerian gas to consumers 
in other parts of Europe. French energy giants have though opposed this initiative (A. 
Lis, 2014, p. 9).  
 
This particular showcase of the differences in Member State preferences even when 
an overall agreement is met on establishing an Energy Union represents how 
disagreement emerges according to what particular norm and policy commitment that 
is to be in the center of the Energy Union. It is though arguable that the policy 
negotiation of the Energy Union, even when entrapment is assumed, presents a case 
of Normative Under-determination. The example of common purchasing involves 
much more than one norm or policy-precedent with implications for the policy 
negotiation under hand – even extending to completely different policy areas, which 
are not at first glance associated with common purchasing as climate policies. We 
must therefore consider the validity of first and foremost the conditions of 
“precedent” and “relevance” to our case. It is conditions that are easily established, as 
the EU has invested several recourses and created extensive policies in the 5 areas the 
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Energy Union addresses. There is however elements the conditions of precedent and 
relevance do not take into account e.g. that these concepts vary greatly from Member 
State to Member State in relation to their applicability and extent as illustrated above. 
Despite the fulfillment the Energy Union policy proposal have of the conditions for 
entrapment, the degree of fulfillment for these conditions are not equal in every 
country, and thus cannot be treated as such. We can still conclude that entrapment is 
likely to emerge under future negotiations of the Energy Union. Still, each Member 
State is not entrapped by the same norm or policy commitment, and the differences in 
the reasons for entrapment. It could very well create reason to believe that a country 
such as Poland will push more for a different policy commitment, than the one under 
which Poland finds itself entrapped. Put in another way – As Poland might find itself 
entrapped by “policy X of a more ambitious climate commitment”; it will continue to 
stress its original preference “policy Y of secure supplies and increased infrastructure 
funding” in the further policy negotiations. Conversely countries such as Denmark 
and Germany might find themself entrapped by “policy Y of secure supplies and 
increased infrastructure funding”, but will continue to stress its original preference 
“policy X of more ambitious climate commitment”, in the further policy negotiations. 
The argument of this point of view is that as the Energy Union contains that many 
different commitments, it would from the theory of Normative Institutionalism also be 
possible to conclude the hypotheses of Entrapment, as any given Member State would 
find itself entrapped by some policy commitment. 
This is an important aspect to establish as it can furthermore challenge the 
conclusions of Normative Institutionalism by using the same argument from an 
Intergovernmentalist perspective: As the Energy Union has as many different focus 
areas and areas of potential gain, most countries would have a self-interested reason to 
engage on the grounds of either one of the policy areas from which it would benefit 
the most. The institutional setting of the Energy Union would thus merely provide an 
arena in which it could pursue its own interest. 
12. Conclusion: 
 
Normative Institutionalism has proven of high internal validity in entrapments ability 
to specify a correlation between the conditions we established as existing in the 
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Energy Union, and how these would effectively foster cooperation in the Energy 
Union. We have by this understanding furthermore utilized the emphasis on the power 
of normative commitments to stress this as the most vital requirement for the Energy 
Union to ultimately succeed in its attempt at constructing a common foreign energy 
policy. This has been achieved by, from the assumption of entrapment, selecting 4 key 
areas where normative commitment could prove to be the significant independent 
variable: Common regulatory frameworks, emergency/solidarity mechanisms, 
increased infrastructure funding and finally a common position towards secure 
supplies.  
 
Through the analysis of these areas a great interconnectivity was evident. This was 
especially concerning the reliance emergency/solidarity mechanism, infrastructure 
funding and secure supplies has on the establishment of common regulatory 
frameworks. This area in particular revealed the need for the conferral of 
legislative/decision making powers from the Member States to supranational authority 
acting on behalf of the EU. An overall conclusion from the analysis sections claims 
that the dimensions where solidarity and cooperation would foster the most effective 
foreign policy results are similarly the ones in which one would from historical and 
Intergovernmentalist perspective expect the highest level of disagreements to emerge. 
The nationally rooted commitment and preference-issues associated with the issue of 
surrendering sovereignty in solidarity catalyzed into a broad discussion of alternative 
explanations on Member States incentive to engage in institutional cooperation and 
commitment to EU. Central to these counter-arguments towards Normative 
Institutionalism was the point that: As the Energy Union consists of not one policy 
commitment and norm, but rather a wide range, Member States, with equally different 
inherent commitments and norms, would find themselves entrapped by different 
commitments and norms, and engaging on rational rather than normative motives to 
ensure that their preferred commitment or norm is carried out. Normative 
Institutionalism and entrapment could thus hold true in this point of the policy 
development as a the mere idea of an Energy Union is widely agreed upon, but the 
following actual policy negotiation might reveal characteristics closer to mutual 
policy compromise and thus be of more Intergovernmentalist nature. Acknowledging 
the fact the Member States in this case has very different reasons to engage, which 
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cannot all be explained by an inherent appreciation of coherence in EU policy. It 
however does challenge the theoretical assumption of a correlation between the 
presence of certain conditions and normative cooperation. Nonetheless, the 
hypotheses of entrapment has proven itself valid in explaining how the conditions of 
precedence, relevance, forum and publicity has encouraged the agreement of 
establishing the Energy Union – at least when it is assumed that all Member States are 
driven by the same motivations to engage. What has proven significantly interesting 
in our study is the applicability of Normative Institutionalism to explain foreign 
energy policy negotiation, as we would argue, for one of the first times in the history 
of the EU. We would argue that the focus on fulfillment of conditions as ground for 
the creation of a norm-consistent theory applies perfectly to the change of the political 
energy landscape in EU, and discourse towards accepting that a common strategy is 
necessary to mitigate the dependency on Russia. This is rooted deeply in the recent 
events accounted for involving disruptions of energy together with the previous 
legislative investment in implementing the areas now compromising the Energy 
Union. Despite Normative Institutionalism’s inability or external invalidity to explain 
many previous policy outcomes, we will argue that the case of the Energy Union 
represents a change to the more traditional approaches to analyzing institutional 
engagement, where normative commitments plays a vital role. This is regardless of 
which commitment or norm that applies to the motive of a Member State as long as 
mutual entrapment occurs and the conditions in use can be said to have had a big 
influence.  
 
Setting aside concerns towards the further negotiations of the Energy Union, where 
national preferences might prove as a challenge, we would from our analysis and 
discussion expect a high degree of cooperation between the Member States as all 
states will find at least one dimension of the Energy Union compatible with its own 
preferences and become entrapped by the others. Assuming this, we would, from what 
has been targeted in existing legislature, indeed also expect the outcome to have a 
significant effect on the EU-Russia relationship for a number of reasons: 
1) Emergency/solidarity mechanism would enhance the EU’s defensive positions 
towards Russia and result in less incentive for Russia to utilize energy disruptions as 
political leverage, as the losses accumulated from these would not be crucial if the 
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necessary preparatory and preemptive steps are taking on the basis of mutual 
solidarity and warning systems.  
2) Increased and cooperative funding on infrastructure would lessen dependence on 
foreign suppliers such as Russia, and thus ease the process of mitigating any 
disruptions under emergencies as reverse gas flows and pooling of resources between 
Member States would be greatly enhanced 
3) Establishing a common strategy towards secure supplies and alternative import 
routes would lower the uneven reliance of Russian gas throughout the EU, and instead 
diversify energy sources so that the disruption of one source would not result in any 
countries loosing significant quantities of their imports. 
4) Common regulatory frameworks would ensure the functioning of the above three 
areas, as decisions would be made on a more collective foundation rather than 
national. The transition towards improved decision-making roles for coordinating and 
regulating bodies in a common regulatory framework could through solidarity and 
cooperation foster a very effective foreign energy policy towards Russia as the EU 
would be able to act collectively on strategic decisions. 
 
The case of the Energy Union is a work in progress and while Normative 
Institutionalism and the hypotheses of entrapment has accounted sufficiently for the 
agreements met so far, it will indeed be interesting to see if this assumption of 
Member State cooperation will hold true when the actual legislation are to be agreed 
upon and implemented. As it seems now, we will argue that the negotiations of the 
Energy Union has lifted the validity of Normative Institutionalism as a simplistic 
explanatory framework for understanding the correlation between norm and policy 
commitments establishing normatively consistent EU policies when certain conditions 
are met. 
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